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problems of Conscience in Some of the Plays of Shakespeare 
INTRODUCTION 
A study of the Shakespeare ·criticism of the Eight-
eenth and the early part of the Nineteenth, Centuries, 
compared with what may be called the modern method of in-
terpretation, reveals striking contrasts. During the 
earlier period the 'interpretation or "appreciation" was 
almost exclusively esthetic. The plays were taken to 
mean, not what Shakespeare intended them to mean, but 
what the interpreters wished them to mean. In the pre-
sent century, however, the labors of scholars have been 
employed upon the exact and detailed analysis of the 
plays, in an effort to discover what was their original 
meaning,--the one Shakespeare put into them,--as inter-
preted not only be means of the text of the plays them-
selves, but by their connection with the history of the 
Renaissance period, and of the age of Elizabeth in par-
ticular. 
This change in the spirit of Shakespeare interpreta-
tion has been especially noticeable in the field of ethics 
and moral philosophy. There was room in this field for 
endless vague and conjectural explanations, of the plays 
in their entirety and of the characters considered indi-
vidually. It has been the effort of recent scholars, 
in this field as in others, to discover as nearly as 
possible Shakespeare's own attitude with regard to moral 
problems, at least as he sets it forth in the plays. 
Much valuable research has been done along these lines; 
however, the specific problem of conscience as a guiding 
factor in man's actions, seemed still to offer many possi-
bilities for fruitful research. It is upon this problem 
then, that the present study is based. 
The first part of the study consists of a general 
statement of the Elizabethan conception of conscience, 
and an endeavor to show how this conception derives from 
the scholastic teaching. I have traced the general princi-
ples upon which this conception is built up, from the 
ancient philosophers up through the medieval, reaching 
their clearest definition in the work of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Then I have endeavored to point out the modi-
fications that the Renaissance brought about in the idea, 
and finally the particular application of the principles 
in Elizabethan psychology and philosophy. 
In the second division of the thesis the place of 
conscience in Elizabethan moral philosophy is discussed. 
The relative importance of foreign influences upon the 
philosophy of the times is a point that has received com-
ment. Then I have endeavored to point out the relation-
ship of reason to conduct, a subject which assists greatly 
~------------------------~ 
in the correct placing of the conscience motive. Revenge 
also bears an important part in the motivating of actions 
at this period, and the study of the Elizabethan idea of 
revenge has a close connection with the conscience idea. 
As a final introductory step before taking up the princi-
pal part of the thesis, it was necessary to explain the 
distinction between the tragic hero and the villain. The 
distinction is brought about to a great extent by the 
difference in motive, and is of great importance for the 
correct interpretation of the dramatic works of the period, 
especially the works of Shakespeare. 
The discussion of Elizabethan psychology in its bear-
ing upon the morality of actions leads finally to the 
center of the research,--an analysis of some of the great 
plays in an effort to interpret the motives for action, 
also the effects of actions,--that is, the conscience 
condemning or praiSing for deeds already done. I have 
selected as the basis of the study the four great ideal 
tragedies,--Macbeth, Othello, King Lear, and above all, 
Hamlet. I have made reference also to a number of other 
tragedies, among them Coriolanus and Richard III, and 
also, to a limited degree, some of the comedies which 
present distinct conscience problems. 
The final chapter of the thesis is a summary of the 
findings in this field, and an attempt to show the great 
r -~-------------------------------------------------------------, 
importance of the conscience theme in influencing the 
action of the plays and the development of the characters. 
These problems were studied from the Renaissance and 
Elizabethan viewpoint, and I have endeavored to show that 
Shakespeare's attitude is authentic and according to 
Christian standards. 
PROBLEMS OF CONSCIENCE 
IN SOME OF THE PLAYS OF SHAKESPEARE 
Chapter I. The Development of the Elizabethan Conception 
of Conscience. 
Of late years it has become increasingly evident to 
students of Shakespeare, that, if one is to understand 
and interpret the works of the great artist in any way 
approaching authenticity, it is necessary to look at 
them from the viewpoint of Shakespeare's own times. This 
modern study of Shakespeare takes into account the entire 
scope of Elizabethan life and culture, and this is partic-
ularly true in the field of ethics and moral philosophy. 
Shakespeare was undoubtedly a man of his time, a 
complete product of the Renaissance. In his plays one 
finds that fullness of enthusiasm for discovery, that 
unbounded patriotism, and that love of life for its own 
sake, which characterized the period. But if Shakespeare 
was a man interested in the fullness of life as he found 
it, he must have been more than anything else a thorough 
student of human nature; and this study led him to a 
profound consideration of moral problems. In an age which 
is credited with being almost entirely secular in its 
viewpoint and its interests, this deep and sincere inves-
tigation of moral problems by the man who is the most 
perfect exponent of his times, is highly significant. 
Some writer. have said distinctly that Elizabethan life 
left out of consideration the idea of religion, and they 
credit, or discredit, Shakespeare with this lack of re-
ligion. 
All things worked together to maKe the 
~ama a full and complete expression of the 
Elizabethan Age. Whatever entered that Age, 
and contributed to make it what it was, or 
at least, what its report has been, entered 
the Drama. To be sure, that had its natural 
exclusions. It was not religious, and had 
little to say of the soul's destinies beyond 
the grave. ~. 
Passages in the plays may doff the bon-
net to the Christian faith; but only to meet 
the dramatic turn. Shakespeare and his plays 
are most genially of this world, its rela-
tionships, its passions, its sublimities and 
depths, its vanities and hopes of fame--but 
all on earth. The conventional references 
to the superhuman or the supernatural are 
often pagan by affinity, and seeming prefer-
ence. 2. 
One may find it necessary to agree with Taylor in 
the statement, that, of formal religion there is little 
expression in Shakespeare, but no one can deny that in 
the plays there is a carefully worked out moral system, 
in which good and evil are rightly related and evaluated, 
and that he recognizes and insists upon the relation of 
mants moral and spiritual life to God in its obligations 
and allegiances. 
1. 
2. 
Henry Osborn Taylor, Thou~t and Expression in the 
Sixteenth Century, Macmil an,~ Y., 1920, VOl.-rI, 
p. 238. 
Ibid: p. 257. 
To understand Shakespeare's delineation of ethical 
and moral values, and the definite and consistent princi-
ples of morality upon which he builds up his great charac-
ters, it is necessary to understand the psychology and 
moral philosophy, not of a later time, but of the time 
in which he lived and wrote. 
If we would understand and appreciate what Shake-
speare meant to portray, we must know the principles 
which he accepted as the basis and motive of moral life, 
--not by any means as he applied it to his own conduct, 
--which is at best a conjecture,--but as he made use of 
it in the delineation of his characters. 
A study of the plays in connection with the psy-
chology of the period reveals that the poet had a defi-
nite and legitimate understanding of the problem of the 
conscience, and that he has made extensive application 
of the problem again and again in his plays, both in 
tragedy and comedy. 
To arrive at a correct and thorough understanding 
of the psychology of which the conscience problem was 
an important part, it is necessary to trace the Eliza-
bethan concept of moral responsibility from its sources, 
since the teachings of ancient and medieval philosophers 
are undoubtedly the basis of Renaissance and Elizabethan 
beliefs on the subject. 
Elizabethan psychology derives primarily from 
Aristotle, and since the development of the science can 
be directly traced, and the ancient beliefs are borne 
out in the later developments, it is necessary, for a 
complete understanding of the system, to begin by a 
comment upon the fundamental principle of Aristotelian 
philosophy in this matter. Before Aristot~, Heraclitus 
taught that reason was a property of the universe, not 
a property inherent in man, and that it was breathed 
into man from the outside, somewhat as sensations were 
received. He did not make reason a party to moral re-
sponsibility as was done by later philosophers who better 
understood its function. 
Aristotle taught that in living things thBre are 
three kinds of soul: the vegetal, which alone is pos-
sessed by plants, and which has to do with life, growth 
and reproduction; the sensible soul, which, together 
with the vegetal soul, is found in animals, and has to 
do with sensation and motion and a seeking after good; 
and, finally, the rational soul, which belongs only to 
3. 
man, and is the seat of the reason and the will. 
Aristotle's sense psychology is much like the accep-
ted psychology of the present time, and in its main 
3. Ruth Leila Anderson, Elizabethan Psychology and 
Shakespeare's Plays, University Press, Iowa City, 
Iowa, 1927, p. 14. 
~~'---------------------------------------. 
-
points agrees closely with that of the scholastics. He 
speaks of the central or common sense, by which he sig-
nifies the intellect and the imagination; and the outer 
senses--the five senses which we recognize as such. His 
maxim, that nothing can be known to the inner sense ex-
cept through the outer, is one of the doctrines of the 
schoolmen. 
A point in the psychology of the ancients, which 
persisted up to the time of Shakespeare, and is of the 
utmost importance in the correct interpretation of the 
plays, is its physiological aspect. Aristotle saw the 
immediate connection between outer stimuli and sensa-
tion, although the science of physiology was too little 
developed to provide an adequate explanation. The 
Greeks speak of a sort of fluid called "vital heat", 
which assumes various forms as it assists the several 
functions of the body. Thus, it is a part of the blood, 
it aids digestion, and becomes more and more refined as 
it ascends to the head. The physician Galen, in the 
third century A. D., explained and systematized this 
theory. 4. 
The Greeks taught that children and animals live 
according to their feelings--thus indicating that they 
4. George Sidney Brett, Psychology, Ancie~t and Modern, 
Longmans Green & Co., N. Y., 1928, pp. 25-27. 
appreciated the lack of moral responsibility in persons 
who have not reached the age of discretion. They taught 
that vices are relapses into primitive states. A brave 
or a temperate man acts bravely in an emergency or over-
comes temptations easily, because he has brought his 
senses under the control of reason. Complete virtue is 
complete control of the impulses by the deliberative or 
calculative reason. This system of ethics is, of course, 
false and incomplete in as much as it disregards the idea 
of Good and the question of eternal justice, and defines 
ethics as the sphere of praise and blame. That is, a 
good man does things that are praised, and a bad one 
does things that are blamed,--not from any idea of re-
sponsibility to a Higher Being, but for the good of the 
state. This also was the doctrine of the Romans, in a 
more restricted sense even than with the GreEk s. The 
Roman idea of right conduct or morals was conformity to 
legal and social customs. 
The Greek and Roman idea of conscience, the judg-
ment in matters of conduct, was systematic and stable, 
but it left out the theistic idea,--there was no con-
sideration of moral obligation to a higher being. Still, 
the ancients have many expressions of praise for tfthe 
peace of a good conscience. u5• The Greeks believed that 
5. Reverend Joseph Rickaby, "Conscience", in Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. IV. 
~~ .. -----------------------------------. 
by constant practice of good deeds, and the experience 
acquired by such practice, one's principles became fixed 
and one became a more desirable and perfect member of 
the State, just as in the Christian, perfect possession 
of God by knowledge and love, will be the result of con-
tinuous attention to the warnings of conscience, and there 
will be less and less likelihood of lapses from duty. 6. 
The scholastic philosophy is based upon that of 
Aristotle, one of the most essential differences being, 
of course, the Christian viewpoint, responsibility to, 
and dependence upon God. 
In the works of the ecclesiastical writers, theology 
held an important place, and reason lost its supreme posi-
tion in favor of revelation. The reason was a supernat-
ural power, not something flowing distinctly from nature, 
but an attribute given to man by God, and by means of 
which man became in a manner like God. Man, by the gift 
of his reason, became responsible to the Giver for his 
voluntary actions. His reason aided him in aspiring to 
the supreme good, and it was against the reason, con-
sidered as one of God's greatest favors to man, to do 
evil, and thus be drawn away from his final end. Rever-
end Joseph Rickaby states: 
6. George Sidney Brett., Psychology;, Ancient and Modern, 
Longmans Green, N. Y., 1928, p. 28. 
F 
------------------------------------------------. 
The natural conscience is not a distinct 
faculty, but the one intellect of man in as much 
as it considers right and wrong in conduct, 
aided meanwhile by a good will, and by the use 
of the emotions, by the practical experience of 
learning, and by the external helps that are to 
the purpose. The natural conscience of the 
Christian is known by him to act not alone, but 
under the enlightenment and the impulse derived 
from revelation and grace in a strictly super-
natural order. 7. 
In the theology of the Middle Ages the material and 
physiological connection of the senses with reason con-
tinued to be accepted. Knowledge must be acquired through 
the senses, but there is a world of immaterial realities 
which can be knovm or comprehended only by the intellect. 
By means of reason one knows God, and by the will one 
reaches out toward Him as the ultimate good. The outer 
senses, according to St. Thomas, were avenues by which 
images were formed by means of the inner senses--common 
sense, memory and imagination,--and then passed on to the 
intellect. He taught that reason was the link or inter-
preter between the knowledge received from the outer senses 
and the intellect, which alone could comprehend God. The 
choice of good and the rejection of evil lay in the will, 
directed and governed by the intellect. In the ecclesi-
astical fathers, emphasis is placed upon the knowing of 
God not by reason alone, but by faith. Faith is the de-
sire to possess God as the highest good, and leads the 
7. Rickaby, op.cit. 
~-----------------------------------------------------, 
will to the performance of right actions. It thus gives 
a sanction to good deeds and is the motive-power of con-
science. It is with reason governing conduct and prac-
tise that this paper is concerned--the field of ethics 
and the judgment of conscience. 
Among medieval writers on the subject of reason, and 
of morality through right reason, Reginald Pecock is a 
sort of compendium of the scholastic theology accepted 
generally by the people. He makes reason the greatest 
of all man's powers. Even faith is subservient to it. 
Whatever could not be proved by reason was not of faith. 
Upon reason depended man's morality, because a deed could 
not be morally virtuous 'unless it accorded with reason. 
The will was a servant of the reason. 
Free will is a power with which may 
freely be loved and chosen that thing which 
reason knoweth and deemeth to be good,--and 
which may command to all other witty and moving 
powers of the soul and to all members of the 
body such moving proper workings as she wills 
that they be commanded. 
Man was made to rule his will and his 
outward and inward wits and their appetites, 
their doings and sufferings, after the doom 
of reason, while he liveth in this life, that 
he may obtain everlasting life before the pres-
ence of God. 8. 
In his definition of sin he points out that it is only by 
8. Reginald Pecock, The Donet. Now first edited from 
Ms. Bodl, 916, by~sie Vaughan Hitchcock, London, 
Humphrey Milford, 1921, p. 12. 
acting contrary to conscience that one can commit sin, 
in other words, temptation is not sin. 
Sin is not in the sinful desires engen-
dered OY-the outward nor even by the inward 
wits. It begins with the consenting of Reason 
and Free Will to sinful desire. The wilful 
choice of sin after Reason has pronounced upon 
it is sin. 9. 
In the Folewer to the Donet Pecock continues his explana-
tion of the relation between reason and free will, and 
gives to reason the credit for curbing the sensual appe-
tites and preventing sin. Thus according to his teach-
ing, free will, working in agreement with reason is what 
defines a dictate of conscience. 
Nearly all the medieval writers use Aristotle's 
division of man's soul into the vegetal, the sensitive, 
and the rational. They agree, of course, as to the 
outer wits, but there are many divergences with regard 
to the relations and divisions of the inner wits. The 
outer wits--the five senses--are the means by which 
knowledge of the outer world is presented to the inner 
wits. The inner wits, according to Batman--are feeling, 
wit, imagination, reason and understanding. lO • Other 
writers name common sense, imagination and memory, as 
9. Ibid: p. 14. 
10. ~man uppon Bartholeme, His Booke, ~ Propietatibus 
Rerum, London, Thomas East, 1582, Liber Tertius, 
Chapter 6, p. 13. 
the internal senses, and say that these are the channels 
by which impressions, received by the outer senses, are 
transmitted to the intellect. In some writers, then, 
reason is considered to be a part of the sensitive soul, 
and in others, as part of the highest, or intellective 
soul. Pecock calls the five inward bodily wits common 
wit, imagination, fantasy, estimation and mind. The 
cmmnon wit presents the sensations received through the 
outer senses to the imagination, which in its turn refers 
them to the fancy or "fantasy". The image, in its turn, 
is given over to the estlination, or judgment, and then 
is presented to the intellect to be loved as Good or 
rejected as Evil. The will is a power by which one 
chooses what the reason, or understanding, deems to be 
good. He says in The Donet, 
Free will is a power with whiCh may 
freely be loved and chosen that thing whiCh 
reason knoweth and deemeth to be good--and 
which may command to all other witty and 
moving powers of the soul and to all members 
of the body such moving proper workings as 
she wills that they be commanded. 11. 
Pecock held that living morally was identical with living 
reasonably. If one lives reasonably, he necessarily lives 
according to faith. Thus reason is the ultimate crite-
rion for action, the guardian and perfecter of con-
science. Phineas Fletcher says that conscience is a 
11. See Note 8. 
~ 
------------------------------------------------. 
"servant of the will, contributing to her proper function-
in the mind",12· thus making conscience a counselor of the 
will rather than of the ~ or understanding. The gen-
eral belief is that the will is the intellect in action, 
and it is the virtue or faculty, joined with rational 
apprehension that carries out what the understanding 
suggests. The rational apprehension was called specu-
lative intellect or understanding when it sought truth 
by contemplation, and practical intellect, when it sought 
good and suggested to the will that the good be accepted 
and the evil rejected. This was the practical judgment 
in matters of conduct which is called conscience. 
Coeffeteau, a Renaissance writer who describes with 
great care and exactness the various passions, says of 
the will that it is an appetite, an object of desire. 
He says: 
To come to the Reasonable Soule; it 
hath two principal powers, the one indued 
with Knowledge, which is the Understanding; 
and the other capable of Desire, which is 
the Will; the which being blind as all appe-
tites are naturally, she followeth in the 
pursuit of her objects, the light of the 
Understanding, by reason whereof she is 
called the intellectual appetite, but more 
properly the Will. The office of our under-
standing, particularly of that which we call 
possible, is to receive, and in receiving to 
know, and in knowing to offer unto the will, 
those kinds or forms, which are sent unto it 
12. Phineas Fletcher, ~ Purple Island, Cambridge, 
1633, p. 20. 
~"----------------------------------------------. 
from the Imagination. l3 • 
The will, as Coeffeteau explains, is called an 
intellectual appetite, because the object of its desire 
must be referred to the light of the understanding. Thus 
the will becomes, in his teaching, the connecting link 
between the outer world evident to the senses, and the 
inner soul of men. 
The appetites, referred to so often in medieval psy-
chology, played an important part in influencing conduct; 
unless they were controlled by reason they became the 
enemy of man's spiritual welfare. According to theo-
logical writers, the natural appetites were always at 
war with the soul, and their solicitings must be turned 
aside before a man was free to act according to the dic-
tates of his conscience. These appetites or desires, 
were divided into three classes--the first and lowest 
were those which had to do merely with the vegetal soul, 
and governed the desire for food and drink; they also 
regulated digestion, assimilation, and the other natural 
functions of the body. These appetites or powers had in 
themselves, of course, no relation to reasonable conduct. 
The second kind of appetite, belonging to the sensitive 
13. F. N. Coeffeteau, A Table of Human Passions With 
Their Causes ~ Effects, Translated into English 
by Edward Grimeston, London, Nicholas Okes, 1621, 
Introduction (no pagination) 
~----------------------------------------------~----------, 
soul, comprised those inclinations by which the soul 
desired that which presented itself as a Good, and rejec-
ted or opposed what appeared to it as evil. These appe-
tites, accordingly, were called concupiscible and iras-
cible, respectively. Coeffeteau, in A Table of Human 
Passions, says: 
It was necessary for the good of man, 
that he should have two kinds of inclinations, 
the one to pursue those things which are pleas-
ing and agreeable to his senses, and to avoid 
those which may any way annoy him: and this we 
call the concupiscible or desiring power; and 
the other, by means whereof he may encounter 
and vanquish whatsoever opposeth itself, cros-
seth his inclinations, or that tends to the 
destruction of his being, or the decay of his 
contentment, which is that we call the iras-
cible or angry power. 14. 
The intellective appetite resides in the rational soul 
and it is that virtue or power which covets the good 
and hates the evil. This is really the will working in 
conjunction with reason. The appetites, generally con-
sidered as such, were those desires which reached out 
toward sensible good, and the will was that power which 
reason urged to reach out toward what it considered good. 
Thus will was a servant of the understanding and held a 
higher place than the sensitive appetites. It was the 
regulation of will by right reason that constituted the 
control of man's actions by his conscience. 
14. Ibid: Introduction 
~-. ----------------------, 
This correspondence of the understanding and the 
will in regulating man's actions, according to Burton, 
consists of three degrees or innate "species": synteresis, 
or the purer part of the conscience, which consisted in 
knowing good or evil; the dicamen rat10nis, Which admon-
ishes us to do good or evil, and the conscience itself, 
which approves good or evil, justifying or condemning our 
actions. This.final classification is what we understand 
by conscience. 15 • Corresponding to the three divisions or 
classes of appetites were three degrees of knowledge: the 
knowledge of sense, which resulted in the pleasure of sense; 
the knowledge of imagination, which found its fulfillment 
in the pleasures of the imagination; and, the knowledge of 
the intellect, Which was the highest of man's delights, 
and whiCh led finally to love and service of God through 
man's reason. The predominance of one or other of these 
types of knowledge in a man was often used in the litera-
ture of the times as a means of estimating character. 
Right conduct, as determined by reason and urged by 
the will, both of Which working in unison constitute the 
natural conscience, would be the complete fulfillment of 
the rational powers of man, even without revelation. But 
15. Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, Bell, London, 
1896, pp. 189-190. 
~----------------------------------------------I ~ 
another element enters here--the rebellion of the sensi-
tive appetites, the affections and the imagination against 
reason. The affections are motions or impulses of the sen-
sitive appetite, which reach out toward good and reject 
evil. The affections are subjects of the imagination, and 
are not entirely within control of the will. They arise 
unbidden at some solicitation of the sensitive appetite. 
They therefore to a certain extent limit the power of 
reason; they are to be brought as soon as possible under 
control so as not to interfere with right conduct. The 
imagination, in all writers of this period, and in eccle-
siastical writers of all times, has. been considered a 
dangerous faculty, one that must be watched and struggled 
against, so that its phantoms may not disturb the reason 
and burden the conscience. The imagination is the faculty 
which receives impressions from the external senses. Then 
it acts as a sort of sending station, distributing its im-
pressions immediately to the memory, or to the reason and 
the understanding to be deliberated on. It may send its 
message to the heart, the seat of the affections. Then 
the idea is presented to the will, Which decides whether 
it is a good or an ill. But if the imagination has been 
allowed to act without the judgment of reason, the lower 
powers, the sensitive appetites, will command the will, 
and the man will act against his conscience. 
~'--------------------------------------. 
The affections are milder motions of the sensitive 
appetite than are the passions. The passions are motions 
so violent that they disturb man's physical well-being. 
This question of the close connection between man's phy-
sical nature and his rational and moral nature is one 
that finds a prominent place in all the psychology and 
ethics of the period. With this subject is related the 
medieval idea of the four humors. These humors are ele-
ments corresponding to fire, earth, air and water, and 
out of them God formed all his Creation. These elements 
in the human body were called melancholy, phlegm, blood 
and choler. They varied in quantity and purity in indi-
viduals. If a man had these four elements mixed in his 
body in the proper proportions, he was near perfection 
both in his physical and his moral and reasonable nature. 
That one of the elements which predominated over the others 
gave to the man his individual characteristics, both phys-
ical and moral. Thus, those men in whom phlegm predomina-
ted were slow and slothful, the sanguine were cheerful 
and courageous, the melancholy sorrowful and hard to please, 
and the choleric easily provoked to anger and very active. 
This psychology of the humors is a descendant of the 
teachings of Galen. It was closely united with the be-
liefs regarding reason and conduct. 
The study of the mind could not be 
r,-------------------------------. 
separated from a study of the body, nor this 
from a study of the four elements. 16. 
The four humors, as said above, if they are in their 
proper proportions tend to the perfection of man. But 
in most instances one or other of the humors is out of 
due proportion. In the same individual, moreover, differ-
ent humors may predominate at different times. Thus physi-
ological disturbances may throw a man out of his usual 
calm or cheerful frame of mind. This, of course, is to 
a certain extent, obviously true. Also, conversely, a 
disturbance in the sensitive soul of man, the soliciting 
or rebellion of the passions over reason, may produce a 
corresponding disturbance in the body, bringing about 
alterations in the animal spirits. 
The passions, according to Craig, resulted, 
not from any imperfection in the faculties 
of the soul, which stood supreme, and, as a di-
vine element, incorruptible, but from physiolog-
ical conditions which cloud or interfere with 
the normal operations of the soul. 17. 
The humors of the body became unbalanced by excess, and 
reason was disregarded. Imagination and passion were 
allowed to gain the upper hand over reason because reason 
was clouded and dulled by intemperance, and imagination, 
aided by the paSSions, remained all the more free. It 
16. Anderson, op.cit. p.lS. 
17. Craig, H. "Shakespeare's Depiction of the Passions", 
Philological Quarterly, IV, (1925) p. lS9. 
~~---------------------------------. 
was the duty of the will to control the appetites through 
the judgments of reason, but when the appetites and 
passions gained supremacy over the reason, the will be-
came the slave of the passions. As Senault expresses it: 
As long as they (the Passions) are a-
wakened by objects, solicited by the Senses, 
and protected by Imagination's self, they 
have no other craft than what they draw from 
Corrupted Nature! But when the Understanding, 
overshadowed by their obscurity or won by 
their solicitations, perverts the Will, and 
obliges this Sovereign to take upon her the 
interest of her Slaves, she makes them guilty 
of her sin, she changes their motions into 
rebellion, and of the insurrection of a Beast, 
makes the fault of a man. It is true, that 
when the understanding keeps within the bounds 
of duty, and is faithful to the Will, he sup-
presses their seditions, and reduceth these 
Mutinies to obedience; she husbandeth their 
humours so well; as taking from all their un-
ruliness, he makes rare and excellent virtues 
of them. In this estate they are subservient 
to Reason, and defend the party which they 
were resolved to fight against. The good or 
the evil that may be drawn from them binds us 
to consider their nature, to observe their pro-
prieties; and to discover their original, to 
the end that, arriving at the exact knowledge 
of them, we may make use of them in our affairs. 18. 
Thus it is evident that the medieval psychologists 
believed that the control of the passions by reason was 
essential to right conduct and to the freedom of man's 
judgment in matters of conduct--the conscience. Most 
of the philosophers of the period agree as to the 
18. J. F. Senault, The Use of the Passions. Written in 
French, but put into-EngIish by Henry, Earl of Mon-
mouth, London. Printed by W. G. for John Sims, 1677, 
pp. 16-17. 
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extremely close relationship be,tween the soul and the 
body, although it was a matter of conjecture as to just 
how this came about'. The passions affected the body, 
and the condition of the body had an important bearing 
upon the passions of the soul, changing and lessening to 
a greater or less degree the supremacy of the reason, and 
the freedom of the will. Another contemporary writer upon 
the subject, Thomas Wright, in his book, ~ Passions of 
the Mind in General, makes the following statements with 
----
regard to effect of passion upon the humors: 
There is no passion very vehement, but 
that it alters extremely some of the four 
humors of the body, and all physicians commonly 
agree that among divers other extrinsical causes 
of diseases, one, and not the least, is the 
excess of some inordinate passion, for although 
it busieth their braines, as also the natural 
Philosophers, to explicate the manner how an 
operation that lodgeth in the soul can alter the 
body, and move the humors from one place to an-
other, yet they consent that it may proceed from 
a certain sympathy of nature, a subordination of 
one part to another, and that the spirits and 
humors wait upon the passions, as their Lords and 
Masters. 19. 
Another point with regard to the passions that was 
accepted generally as an explanation of the modifications 
in a man's moral nature in advancing stages of his life 
is that which has to do with the difference in the pas-
sions that affect man in youth and in old age; and also 
19. Wright, Thomas: The Passions of the Mind in General, 
London, 1630, Chapter I, p. 4-.- - - --
-the effect of climate upon the passions. In youth a man 
is influenced strongly by the passions of love and anger. 
He is given to acting quickly, with little or no time for 
the judgment of reason. However, he is not covetous, be-
cause he has not had the experience of poverty, and there-
fore has no desire for earthly goods other than what he 
possesses. 
Young men are commonly rich in invention, 
but poor in matters of judgment; they are fit 
for execution but incapable of any great design. 20. 
These words by Coeffeteau state other outstanding differ-
ences between the characteristics of youth and age, and 
indicate what the medieval psychologist would expect with 
regard to the steadiness of young men, and the relation 
of their actions to cool judgment. They are most likely 
to act impetuously, not heeding the voice of their con-
science, particularly in regard to certain vices that de-
pend upon the urgent demands of passion. 
To sum up in a few words the origin and development 
of the medieval psychological system, especially in regard 
to man's actual responsibility for actions: The system 
originated principally with Aristotle, who first taught 
the doctrine of the three souls in man; the vegetal soul, 
common to all living things, whether plants or animals; 
20. Coeffeteau, op.cit., pp. 654-671. 
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the sensitive soul, belonging to the lower animals and 
to man; and the rational soul, exclusively a quality of 
man. Man is endowed with outer wits--the five senses; 
and the inner wits--namely, common wit or sense, imagina-
tion or fantasy, estimation or reason, and mind or under-
standing. The outer wits presented their sensations to 
the inner common sense, where the image was presented 
immediately to the imagination, or was referred to the 
higher understanding. The judgment pronounced upon it, 
classifying it as good to be loved, or as evil to be re-
jected. The will, if it acted freely, and without undue 
influence from the imagination, the affections or the 
passions, accepted the good and renounced the evil. The 
will was ordained to follow the light of reason and it 
would do so, so long as it ruled over the appetites and 
governed them by the wisdom it gained from reason. Reason 
was a power by which spiritual things were known, and by 
which one might find out what was true or false, good or 
bad. Allied to this power of the higher understanding 
was the idea of conscience, a judge of actions and a 
counsel of morals. 
The psychological system which I have followed from 
its sources up to the period with which we are at present 
concerned, provides a background for the correct placing 
of the Elizabethan theories with regard to the conscience. 
-Conscience was a judge of morality, powerful as a deter-
rent to crime when it was joined closely with the higher 
reason acting calmly and without influence from passion; 
but weak and powerless to guide the actions of a man if 
he allowed his will to be controlled by passion rather 
than by reason. Conscience to the Elizabethan was a 
definite and powerful force, a voice to be hearkened to 
at all costs, the disregarding of which carried with it 
its own punishment. The theory of conscience, applied in 
life and also in artistic literature, constituted all the 
difference between the tragic hero and the villain, be-
tween saints and sinners. It is not surprising that 
Shakespeare, with his highly developed sense of dramatic 
values, linked with an almost superhuman insight into 
human nature, would seize upon this problem of conscience 
when he brings into being with the utmost fidelity to 
nature and the supreme perfection of art, the great pag-
eant of characters which are the creation of his genius. 
~ --------------------------------------------------------------. ,.
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Chapter II. The Place of Conscience in Elizabethan 
Psychology. 
The philosophy of the Elizabethans is an outgrowth 
of the Medieval system, a bare suggestion of which I have 
endeavored to give in the previous chapter. The intimate 
relationship of the study of the mind with that of the 
body, the influence of exterior conditions upon conduct, 
the extreme importance of the passions in determining 
conduct and fixing the degree of praise or blame--are 
some of the leading features of Medieval psychology which 
were carried over into the Elizabethan. 
The Renaissance, especially as it manifested itself 
in Italy, was of great importance in changing the outlook 
of Elizabethans with regard to moral philosophy, although 
the medieval background still remained the bulwark of the 
system. The humanistic movement, applied to all who were 
inspired by the new faith in beauty and reason, and who 
sought to realize the new exalted hope of humIDl progress, 
modified to a great extent man's attitude toward God and 
his own soul. In many instances it proved only a further 
incentive to the love and worship of God, because of the 
greater appreciation of His gifts, while in others it 
had the effect of dulling man's feeling of religion and 
making him interested exclusively in the affairs of this 
world. 
The European Renaissance was marked by a boundless 
enthusiasm for the newly discovered art and literature 
of ancient Greece. Men were fired by a new resolve to 
make the best and not the worst of life upon earth. They 
were ambitious to cultivate as the highest good the idea 
of beauty. 
The Elizabethan Age, rich as it was in enthusiasm 
for extending its knowledge along all lines, and for em-
ploying man's capabilities to new and better advantage, 
was not likely to be introspective. The question of man's 
relations with his Creator was not by any means uppermost 
in his mind. 
This secular viewpoint was more marked in England 
than in other countries, which felt strongly the influence 
of the Renaissance, and it manifested itself remarkably 
in the literature of the period. The medieval philosophy, 
influenced as it had been by the humanist movement of the 
Renaissance, was still the basis of character portrayal 
in artistic literature as in the works on psychology, phil-
osophy and religion; but in many instances, the standards 
of conduct were without more than an incidental relation-
ship to God. The period was by no means consciously ir-
religious; it was enthusiastically and passionately human 
in its aims and aspirations. Of the spirit of this great 
age, even in its rather indifferent attitude toward 
~~---------------------------------------. 
-
religion, we find perfect expression in the works of 
Shakespeare. We find not the least flaw in his moral 
system, but we search in vain for any definite expression 
of religious thought, expression or belief. He believes 
whole-heartedly in the dependence of man upon his Maker, 
and in his obligation to lead a moral life. He never 
allows, in all his range of characters, that one feel 
sympathy for evil done, or that the evil should triumph 
for any length of time, but one is bound to acknowledge 
that the life upon earth is much more attractive to Shake-
speare and to the characters that he has created, than is 
any looking forward to another life. 
Sir Sidney Lee, in "Foreign Influence on Shakespeare", 
thus describes the spirit of the Elizabethan Age: 
Elizabethan literature, which was the 
noblest manifestation in England of the Ren-
aissance, reached its apotheosis in Shake-
speare. It had absorbed all the sustenance 
of the new movement--the enthusiasm for the 
Greek and Latin classics, the passion for ex-
tending the limits of human knowledge, the re-
solve to make the best and not the worst of life 
upon earth, the ambition to cultivate the idea 
of beauty, the conviction that man's reason was 
given him by God to use without restraint. All 
these new sentiments went to the formation of 
Shakespeare's work, and found there perfect de-
finition. 21. 
Sir Sidney Lee's. comment on the spirit of the age, 
21. Sir Sidney Lee, "Foreign Influences on Shakespeare", 
in Great Englishmen 2! ~ ~ Century, London, 
Constable, 1904, p. 317. 
-and on Shakespeare's particular expression of it, summa-
rizes Shakespeare's attitude toward Renaissance culture. 
His attitude toward religion is expressed by Wyndham 
Lewis, who quotes from Bradley as follows: 
The Elizabethan drama was almost wholly 
secular; and while Shakespeare was writing, he 
practically confined his view to the world of 
non-theological observation and thought, so 
that he represents it substantially in one and 
the same way, whether the period of the story 
is pre-Christian or Christian. He looked at 
this secular world most intently and seriously, 
without regard to anyone's hopes, fears or 
beliefs. 22. 
This does not imply, by any means, that Shakespeare is 
unethical in his teaching; it rather suggests that he 
has a definite ethical system, if not a theological one. 
The ethical system that Shakespeare depicts is, as 
has been said before, based upon the philosophy of Aris-
totle, Christianized and developed by the Church Fathers, 
elaborated and systematized to a great degree in the medi-
eval period, and further perfected under Renaissance in-
fluence. One can understand much of Shakespeare's char-
acter portrayal only by constant reference to medieval 
psychology. As he was not a religious man, in the strict 
sense of the word, neither was he a philosopher. He was, 
quoting Lewis again, 
22. Wyndham Lewis, The Lion and the Fox, London, 1927, 
p. 169, (Quoted from Bradley~ 
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a great and accomodating artist, 
accomodating himself, with great suppleness, 
but not slavishly--to the life, art and ideas 
around him. He was not inclined to any very 
strong expression of belief, although within 
that receptive frame he displays very much 
more passion and prejudice than is generally 
allowed. Nevertheless, that the framework 
was opf,ortunist, accomodating, and in that 
sense 'unoriginal ~t is evident. And it is in 
that sense that he was "impersonalll--a partic-
ularly glorious parasite on everything. 23. 
Shakespeare made use in his plays of the psychology 
of his contemporaries, as Miss Anderson says: 
His psychology was a crude explanation of 
observable facts, based on the science of the 
Middle Ages and motivated in its development 
by a desire to understand the functioning of 
the soul for the better regulation of conduct. 24 • 
One of the fundamental principles of Elizabethan ethics 
was the belief that the faculties of the soul must be 
kept under strict control, so that they might not r.ebel 
against reason. The will must unite with reason to com-
mand the soul to act well, but as soon as the will turns 
against reason and becomes a slave of the passions, the 
conscience is no longer obeyed, and the sovereignty of 
the reason is destroyed. ~Vhen the senses and the imagina-
tion join forces to entice the affections, then the will 
is drawn toward the affections and away from reason. 
Right thinking and right doing spring 
23. Ibid: p. 152. 
24. Anderson, op.cit., p. 155. 
rr 
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alike from the supremacy of the intellect, 
understanding and will, but usually imagina-
tion determines thought, and the affections 
control action. 25. 
The mind must work through the senses. Therefore it is 
evident that frequently the lower nature of man gains the 
ascendancy over the higher, and the conscience, which is 
the will working in conjunction with the reason to bring 
good actions, is not heeded. 
The control of the will by reason, and the correct 
balance in the powers of the soul that brings about tem-
perance and virtue and the joy of a good conscience, are 
governed to a considerable extent by psysiological con-
ditions, by a preponderance of certain humors in the body, 
by bodily imperfections and deformities. A good man's 
conscience is to be relied upon to judge properly of his 
actions, but a man who is bad by ttcomplexion", by nature, 
by environment, or by the influence of climate, finds it 
very difficult to hear the voice of his conscience, be-
cause his actions are naturally bad. By persistent ef-
forts these natural tendencies may be overcome, but it 
is almost impossible for education or philosophy or reli-
gion to counteract the effects of naturally evil propen-
sities. In these persons, conscience is almost entirely 
deadened, but we find it in some instances making itself 
25. ~: note, p. 139. 
felt when the wicked person has in some way lost control 
oi his exterior senses, as in sleep; as in the case of 
King Richard and of Lady Macbeth. 
Some specific problems with regard to conscience are 
met with in the Elizabethan psychology of revenge. 
The most definite statement of the whole 
problem of evil was made for the Renaissance 
in one of the moral essays of Plutarch, the 
philosopher, who, although a Pagan, was able 
to guide moral teaching. The treatise was 
published in 1603, among the Morals transla-
ted by Philemon Holland. The second answer 
is the one which seems most clearly to have 
been accepted by Shakespeare, for it affirms 
that sin brings inevitably its own punishment 
to the heart and conscience of the sinner: 
but wickedness engendering within itself (I 
wot not What) displeasure and punishment, not 
after a sinful act is committed, but even at 
the very instant of committing, it beginneth 
to suffer pain due to the offence; neither is 
there a malefactor, but when he seeth others 
like himself punished beareth forth his own 
cross; whereas mischievous wickedness frameth 
of her self the engines of her own torment, 
as being a wonderful artisan of a miserable 
life, which (together with shame and reproach) 
hath in it lamentable calamities, many terrible 
frights, fearful perturbations and passions of 
the spirit, remorse of conscience, desperate 
repentance, and continued troubled and unquiet-
ness. 26. 
Miss Campbell traces the Renaissance idea of tragedy 
from the medieval idea. It was chiefly concerned with an 
explanation that could justify the ways of God to men. 
It came to seek the justice which must inhere in the fall 
26. Lily B. Crunpbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, 
Slaves of PaSSion, Cambridge, 1930, p. 21. 
of princes (which in the beginning was the chief subject 
of tragedy) if there was a God of justice. And it found 
that justice in the error or the folly which caused men 
to bring down evil upon themselves. Tragedy came to 
stress more and more the teaching of Renaissance philosophy, 
that the man sins who would undertake to execute privately 
the justice of God. God will Himself execute justice 
through calamity visited upon the sinner; or through jus-
tice executed by the magistrates as His agents; (in the 
case of Hamlet, he was appointed by God as a magistrate 
to execute His justice.) Sometimes God executes justice 
through the troubled heart and uneasy conscience which 
are the penalty of sin, as in the case of Richard III. 
An important distinction, in this study of conscience, 
is to be made between the tragic hero and the villain. 
The tragic hero sins under the influence of passion. He 
hears the warnings of conscience, but the will is perver-
ted, and does not join with reason. In the case of the 
villain, the passions have so long held the mastery over 
the reason, that the reason itself coldly chooses evil. 
Miss Lily Campbell thus explains the distinction between 
a tragic hero and a villain: 
Passion might cloud the understanding 
so that judgment could not be well made, or 
might sway the will by impetuous summons, 
and thus lead to sin that brought evil upon 
innocent and quiet. alike. 
-Passion might be so excessive that 
reason would be, through the effect of pas-
sion on the humors, altogether lost. Thus 
no moral judgment could be given. 
But that is not to say that the effect 
of passion in bringing on these abnormal 
states of unreason was not bringing about its 
own punishment. 
Finally, however, passion might pervert 
the will, so that it maliciously willed that 
which it \nlled. Reason was itself perverted 
in such a case, and the sin became mortal. 
The tragic hero sins under the influence 
of passion, his reason failing to Check his 
passion. His passion may lead him to madness, 
but as long as his passion is in conflict with 
reason, he has not committed mortal sin. \~n, 
however, passion has taken possession of his 
will, has perverted his will, when, in perfect 
accord with passion, his reason directs evil 
through the will, then we have a villain, one 
who is dyed in sin, one whose sin is mortal. 27. 
The great majority of moral and philosophical writers 
of the period lay stress upon the influence of the passions 
in perverting the will and blinding the judgment in such 
a way as to weaken man's moral responsibility and stifle 
the voice of his conscience. Conscience acting in itself, 
without any undue influence from the passions or the af-
fections, will guide a man truly and safely; but the 
moral judgment is warped and distorted by passion to such 
a degree as to be no longer a reliable guide. Reason 
must be allowed to rule supreme if a man is to act safely 
27. Campbell, op.cit., p. 101. 
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in accord with his conscience; any departure from reason 
is dangerous. A noble and virtuous character will be-
come vicious if he lets his heart and his imagination 
blind his intellect. A man is truly honest and virtuous 
if he follows nature, that is to say (according to Charron) 
if he acts in accordance with right reason. 28 • 
Charron continues, 
And the applauses, and joys, and trans-
ports of a good conscience, as they are sure 
to us, and cannot be withered by any who envy 
our virtue or our fame; so are they likewise, 
so large and full, so generous and noble, and 
sufficient, as may very well encourage, and 
satisfy us, during our continuance in this 
present world. 29 • 
He insists also upon the influence that complexion and 
climate have upon a person's actions, and declares that 
those men that are good naturally have not the same 
claim to the praise and honor of their fellovrraen, as 
those who, to become good, must act in a manner contrary 
to their natural disposition; these last alone, he says, 
are truly virtuous. This doctrine of the difficulty that 
a man has to overcome natural tendencies is referred to 
again and again in Shakespeare, and the influence of 
man's surroundings and his Itcomplexion" are frequently 
referred to as palliating excuses for crime or at least 
for irregular conduct. Thus Othello acts as he does 
28. Charron, Pierre, Of Wisdom, Translated by G. Stanhope, 
London, 1763, p. 64. 
29. Ibid: p. 75. 
because of his complexion. That natural tendencies may 
be overcome is also subscribed to frequently in Shakespeare; 
as for instance, when Hamlet says, 
For use almost can change the stamp 
of nature. 30. 
Thus one sees that right conduct was a matter of the pro-
per restraint of the affections and the imagination--a 
true temperance which would give to the judgment its de-
served freedom, and which would incline the will to accept 
the dictates of reason rather than the lower solicitations 
of the imagination and the passions. This supremacy of 
the reason was more or less under n~n's control, but a 
body in which there was an ill proportion of elements 
and humors inclined the soul to evil, and interfered with 
the freedom of the will, although it did not contradict 
or render it void. Vices consist not in our faculties, 
but in our habits, and our habits depend upon our will; 
and it is therefore the fault of our will that we are evil, 
and not originally of our nature. The will was responsi-
ble for action; the Elizabethans insist upon this, but 
they again and again point out how difficult it is to 
overcome natural tendencies. Thus it followed that the 
conquering of evil tendencies was a mark of nobility of 
character. 
30. Hamlet, III, 4, 168. 
rr In considering the power of a man's conscience to 
influence him to perform good deeds or to refraining 
from evil ones, it is important to study the various 
sorts of wicked persons, with reference to the hold that 
evil has upon them. Charron thus describes lithe three 
sorts of wicked persons. II 
Some, first, are perfectly incorporated 
with evil, they reason themselves into it; 
their resolutions and the whole bend of their 
wills are fixed entirely in its interests; or 
else long custom hath got such a perfect mas-
tery over them that they cannot disengage 
themselves. These miserable wretches are ut-
terly abandoned; their very understanding is 
vitiated, sees, consents to, and approves the 
evil; and this is usually the case, when vice 
and debauchery meet with a strong and vigorous 
mind, and hath taken such deep root in it~ 
that it comes at last to. be naturalized, and 
of a piece with it; all the faculties are tinc-
tured, it is corrupted throughout, and vice so 
closely interwoven, as to become a part of its 
temper and constitution. Others, secondly, 
have their intervals of folly only; they are 
wicked now and then by fits, just as any vio-
lent gush of a temptation disturbs or puts 
them out of their course; as some impetuous 
passion drives them headlong upon the rocks; 
so that these men are surprised, and carried 
away forcibly, by a current too strong for 
them to stem. The third sort are betwixt 
these two extremes. They have a right notion 
of vice, considered in itself; and when they 
reflect upon their fault abstractedly, do 
sincerely accuse and condemn themselves for 
it; and thus they differ from the first sort, 
who are advanced even to the desperate degree 
of even a good liking for wickedness. But 
then they have not the violence or surprise of 
passions or temptations to qualify and exten-
uate their crime; and in this respect they 
differ from the second sort, too. But these 
men go to work in cold blood, and with great 
deliberation; they weigh circumstances, and 
drive a bargain as it were; observe well the 
heinousness of the sin; and put the pleasure 
or profit it brings into the contrary scale; 
and thl1S they barter away their souls, and 
are content to be wicked at a certain price, 
and for such as they think a valuable consider-
ation. 31. 
Continuing his discussion of ,the three sorts of wicked 
men, Charron introduces us to another phase or applica-
tion of the conscience--that which condemns us after a 
wicked action is perforraed. He says: 
Now the first of these three sorts are 
past repenting by ordinary means, and nothing 
less than an unusual and almost miraculous 
impression from heaven can reclaim them. For 
they are past feeling and commit evil even 
with greediness. Besides, the understanding 
is brought over to an approbation of the thing; 
and so all sense of remorse must be lost, which 
proceeds chiefly from acting against our better 
judgment; the soul is entirely corrupted, the 
distinctions of good and evil obliterated and 
worn away; and consequently the will can be 
under no solicitude to restrain or refuse. The 
third sort of men, though they may appear in 
some measure to repent, and condemn themselves, 
yet in reality, and properly speaking, they 
do not. Take the fact by itself, but view it 
dressed up in all its gay attire, with all the 
circumstance of pleasure and profit, that rec-
ommend and set it off and you shall find them 
of another opinion. They think the advantage 
of their sin a sufficient compensation for 
their guilt; and cannot be said to repent of 
that, which had the full and free consent of 
their reason and conscience. So that in truth 
the second sort seem to be the only persons 
that are seriously concerned to repent and reform. 32 . 
31. Charron, op.cit., pp. 76-77. 
32. Ibid: pp. 77-78. 
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Related to this idea of the accusing conscience, 
WDich brings about in some the purpose of amendment, is 
the idea of despair--a passion by which the soul is made 
to desist from following after that which it is impos-
sible to obtain. A man may be so steeped in vice that 
his conscience, active enough in the early part of his 
wicked career, becomes no longer his accuser; or if it 
does accuse him, he turns a deaf ear to its solicita-
tions, with the explanation that there is no further 
hope for him. We see this in rl.lacbeth, who says, 
I am in blood steppfd in so far that, 
Should I wade no more, 
Returning were as tedious as go ofer. 33. 
The effect of despair upon a man may be of opposite 
kinds: he may acquire by it a sort of false boldness, 
as in the case of Macbeth; or it may make its victim 
weak and fearful, as in the case of Claudius. 
Another application of the term conscience is found 
in the term a "good conscience", one that praises a man 
for actions well performed; this joy of a good conscience 
is referred to by Charron in the following words: 
To the composition of an easy and 
quiet mind, two ingredients are indispen-
sably requisite. The first, and indeed 
the chief, is a clear and good conscience; 
which does inspire men with wonderful 
strength and assurance; and is a mighty 
33.Macbeth, III, 4, 135-7. 
stay and defence, and support, in all manner 
of contingencies--let a man be never so stout, 
and a stranger to fear, yet if he be not a 
good man, and his conscience cannot speak peace 
to him--he will never be capable of this happy 
tranquillity of spirit, this perfection and 
fruit of wisdom, which we are at present treat-
ing of. 34. 
La Primaudaye, another French moralist who was well knov'ln 
in England during the Elizabethan period, and whose book 
on ~ French Academie, was a sort of compendium of natu-
ral and moral philosophy, gives a clear, although quaint 
and naive, explanation of the theory of conscience, and 
of the relation that the will should have with the higher 
part of man rather than the lower. He says: 
Seeing God hath placed the heart between 
the head and the belly, the vital virtue of 
the "Soul between the nutritive, and the will 
between the understanding and the most sensual 
part in us; therefore the heart, affections 
and will ought to look always on high and not 
downward, to the end they should join to the 
most noble, celestial and divine part, and 
not to that which is most base, sensual, and 
earthly. 35. 
True it is, that the he'art and will often 
deceive themselves in the choice and election 
of that 'Which is good, whether it be that 
following reason and judgment corrupted, which 
should show what is good, they embrace their 
error; or whether it be that will being cor-
rupted of itself through sin, letteth loose 
the bridle against the judgment of reason, 
and so suffereth herself to be carried head-
long by her evil affections, in following 
34. Charron, op.cit., p. 250. 
35. La Primaudaye, Peter, ~ French Acag.emie, London, 
Thomas Adams, 1618, p. 511. 
some false show of good. Whereupon it commonly 
cometh to pass, that instead of joy, which the 
heart should receive of good, unto which the 
will tendeth naturally, it receiveth great sor-
row and griefs after knowledge taken of the 
fault. 36. . 
All the children of Adam are endued with 
reason and understanding, and have the know-
ledge of good and evil engraven and engrafted 
in their conscience. There is no man--that 
hath not some effect and sparks of this light 
of life. But this is not enough to make man 
possess the true peace of conscience--the spirit 
of the same word of God. The kingdom of heaven 
is at hand. We shall understand and know what 
our celestial inherit~ce is. We shall obtain 
a certain testimony in our consciences of the 
difference between being the children of God 
and the children of the devil. 37. 
La Primaudaye in another place warns us against "custom 
in sinning", remarking that custom stills the voice of 
conscience, and he gives a striking explanation of the 
"furies" that were believed to be supernatural agencies 
appointed to torment the wicked. He says that they are 
nothing else but the torments of an evil conscience. 
In the above passages we see that La Primaudaye 
accepted nearly the same doctrine as Charron with regard 
to the three classes of wicked men, and also with regard 
to a man whose conscience gives him true peace. 
As a final summing up of the Elizabethan doctrine 
of conscience, we may say that it is a development of the 
medieval, with some changes brought about by Renaissance 
36. Ibid: p. 467. 
37. Ibid: pp. 866-7. 
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influence, as for exruaple, the lessening of the impor-
tance of the rewards or punisbments of a future life as 
a sanction for actions. The theory of conscience was 
based upon the close relationship of the three souls or 
faculties in man, and the correspondence of man's soul 
with outer circumstances. An important consideration 
was the classification of sinners into three classes or 
types--those Who were surprised into sinning, those who 
were so blinded by passion that the reason lost control 
of the will; and those who were deliberately evil. Fi-
nally the Elizabethan moralists and psychologists refer 
aga:in and again to the easily moved or influenced con-
science, and to the joy of a good conscience, together 
with its ability to give to the man who possesses it all 
the tranquillity and peace of true wisdom. 
According to many modern students of Shakespeare 
psychology and moral philosophy, the conscience was a 
faculty which was governed, not so much by a man's moral 
principles, as by passing sensations. Hence it was likely 
to change rapidly with changing circmnstances, and with 
changing physiological conditions. The passions, which 
often gained control of the will, and thus deprived 
reason of its sovereignty, and with it, the conscience, 
which was reason applied for a certain purpose, changed 
with changes in the elements, and the hlli~ors of the body. 
According to Craig, the passions result not from any 
imperfection of the faculties of the soul, which stands 
supreme, and, as a divine element, incorruptible, but 
from physiological conditions, which cloud or interfere 
with the normal operations of the soul. He continues: 
Numerous illustrations of the power of 
passion can be found in Shakespeare's plays, 
and also of Shakespeare's familiarity with 
the theory of the passionB. So universally 
and so deeply does the consciousness of 
correlated mental and bodily states enter 
into the expression of thought and feeling, 
that it may be said to constitute a principal 
basis of Shakespeare's realism, and to be a 
chief means by Which he appeals to human feel-
ings. 38. 
38. "Shakespeare's Depiction of the Passions tl , in 
Philological Quarterly, Vol. IV, (1925) pp. 191-3. 
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Chapter III. The Problem of Conscience as Studied 
in Some of the Plays of Shakespeare. 
Before taking up specific conscience problems 
in the plays of Shakespeare, some general observations 
may be made, which apply to the whole moral problem 
as handled by the great dramatist. 
As has been said before, many students of Shake-
speare have come to the conclusion that he was not 
strictly a philosopher, surely not consciously a moral-
ist, but there is no denying the fact that we find in 
the plays a definite moral system. If we deny that he 
was a philosopher or psychologist, we cannot refuse 
him the honor of being the greatest observer of human 
nature that has ever lived. Perhaps he did not study 
and portray psychology as a science, but he understood 
it practically, as few men have done. And as the age 
in which he lived was an age of awakened enthusiasm for 
all sorts of knowledge, ancient and new, we find all 
this exemplified in the works of the great artist, who 
steadily and surely "held the mirror up to nature.fI 
His ability to picture the full and complete life of 
the world about him is expressed by Taylor in the fol-
lowing words: 
In some way each Elizabethan expresses 
L------------------------! 
I. 
some phase of the contemporary world, and 
Shakespeare the impression of the universal 
whole. It is himself that he expresses 
through the universality of his illumination, 
or in any casual borrowing; he, a sheer play-
wright, making plays for the theater, follow-
.:Lng this business, inevitably expresses 
himself, and through himself the enlighten-
ment and genius of his age. 39. 
Shakespeare undoubtedly looked at life from the 
outside. He interpreted human life in his great char-
acters from the viewpoint of the spectator. His ethics 
are built upon human life as it then was; and if one 
is to judge correctly of the morality of the characters, 
one must remember the period and the audience for which 
the characters were created. This makes all the more 
forceful the conclusion that Shakespeare's ethics are 
essentially valid and right, since his characters 
seem as true to life now as they must have been to 
Shakespeare's own audiences. 
According to many modern students of Shakespeare 
psychology and moral philosophy, the conscience was a 
faculty which was governed, not so much by a man's 
moral principles, as by passing sensations. Hence it 
was likely to change rapidly with changing circum-
stances. Miss Anderson elucidates this theory. She 
39. Taylor, ££. cit. p. 218. 
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says that the ready response of the mind to reports 
from the senses makes of conscience a fleeting thing, 
yielding quickly to ,a new stimulus. 40. The conscience, 
according to this statement, woul'd not be a fixed means 
of jud~aent, but rather an instrument of the passions. 
This is illustrated in many passages, for instance in 
the second murderer, in Richard III: 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
Sec. Murd. 
'F'I'rst Murd. 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
Sec. IVIurd. 
First IVIurd. 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
Sec. Murd. 
First Murd. 
The urging of that word "judgment U 
hath bred a kind of remorse in me. 
What, art thou afraid? 
Not to kill him, having a warrant 
for it; but to be damned for kill-
ing him, from which no warrant can 
defend us. 
I thought thou hadst been resolute. 
So I am, to let him live. 
Back to the Duke of Gloucester, tell 
him so. 
I pray thee, stay awhile; I hope my 
holy humour will change; 'twas wont 
to hold me but while one would tell 
twenty. 
How dost thou feel thyself now? 
Faith, some certain dregs of con-
science are still within me. 
Remember our reqard, when the deed is 
done. 
Zounds, he dies; I had forgot the 
revvard. 
\¥hereis thy conscience now? 
In the Duke of Gloucester's purse. 
So when he opens his purse to give 
us our reward, thy conscience flies 
out. 
Let it go; there's few or none will 
entertain it. 
How if it comes to thee again? 
40. Anderson, 2£. cit. p. 93. 
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Sec. Murd. I'll not meddle with it; it is a 
dangerous thing, it makes a man 
a coward; a man cannot steal but 
it accuseth him ••• ; and every man 
that means to live well, endeavors 
to trust to himself, and live with-
out it. 41. 
This sudden deposing of conscience from its throne 
as judge and controller of man's actions is typical of 
ignorant and unprincipled men; conscience loses its 
force when it counsels against the passions. We find 
this same attitude ·t;oward the conscience in the de-
bate between Launcelot's conscience and the fiend, in 
the Merchant of Veniceo 
Laun. Certainly my conscience will serve 
me to run from this Jew my master. The fiend 
is at mine elbow and tempts me saying to me 
'Gobbo, Launcelot Gobbo, good Launcelot', or 
'good Gobbo' or 'good Launcelot Gobbo, use 
your legs take the start, run away'. My 
conscience says 'No; ,take heed, honest Laun-
celot; take heed, honest Gobbo; or, as afore-
said, honest Launcelot Gobbo; do not run, scorn 
~~nning with thy heels. '. Well, the most cou-
rageous fiend bids me pack; 'Via! " says the 
fiend; 'Away!', says the fiend; for the heavens, 
rouse up a brave mind1 says the fiend; and run! 
Well, my conscience, hanging about the neck of 
my heart, says very wisely to me, 'My honest 
friend, Launcelot, being an honest man's son, 
or rather an honest woman's son;' for, indeed, 
my father did something smack, something grow 
to, he had a kind of taste; well, my conscience 
says 'Launcelot, budge not.' 'Budge', says the 
fiend. 'Budge not', says my conscience. 'Con-
science', say I, 'you counsel well'. 'Fiend', 
say I, 'you counsel well'; to be ruled by my 
conscience, I should stay with the Jew, my 
l _____ 4_.l_o ___ R_l_·c_h_a_r_d __ I_I_I_, __ I_, __ 4_, __ 1_O_7_-_1_4_4_. __________________________ ~ 
master, who, God save the mi"_rk, is a kind 
of devil; and to run away from the Jew, I 
should be ruled by the fiend, who, saving 
your reverence, is the devil himself. 
Certainly the Jew is the very devil in car-
nal; and, in my conscience, my conscience 
is but a kind of hard conscience, to offer 
to counsel me to stay with the Jew. The 
fiend gives the more friendly counsel. I 
will run, fiend; m~2heels are at your com-
mand; I will run. • 
True, this speech is a sort of burlesque upon the 
theory of the solicitations of the lower nature against 
the conscience; nevertheless, it is authentic accord-
ing to the Elizabethan psychology of the passions and 
affections warring against the reason. In this in-
stance the desires of Launcelot are personified in the 
fiend. ~lis situation, the fiend tempting man against 
his conscience, was familiar to medieval and Renaissance 
audiences. The fiend as a visible force for evil was 
an integral part of morality plays, and he was retained 
in many of the later dramas. 
The words "My conscience, hanging about the neck 
of my heart", bear directly upon the theory that the 
conscience, a counsellor of the. understanding, is op-
posed to the affections, whose principal seat is in 
the heart. Launcelot argues with his conscience, 
and his passions, in the person of the fiend, get the 
better of his judgment. In this instance, reflection 
42. Merchant of Venice, II, 3, 1-34 
was an enemy to right conduct; this is unusual in 
Shakespeare. Miss Anderson points this out in dis-
cussing the relation of the tragic hero to his con-
science. She cites especially the case of Hamlet, and 
shows that it was his "thinking too precisely of the 
event" that prevented the accomplis.hment of what he was 
morally certain was a duty imposed by Heaven. Many of 
the wicked characters speak against deliberation; Mac-
beth knows that 
Lf it were done when 'tis done, 
then 'twere well 43 
It were done quickl-y. • 
Richard III says that "fearful connnenting is a leaden 
servitor." King Claudius, for fear deliberation will 
cool Laertes' purpose of revenge, urges him to act again-
st Hamlet immediately. These men are afraid to give 
their conscience an opportunity to gain control over 
their actions. These men who speak against deliberation, 
in many instances also exhibit a fear of conscience, 
Sometimes the conscience is blamed as a weakening in-
" " 44. fluence, devised to keep the strong in awe. 
It "makes cowards of us all." 
If a man desires hasty action, performed without 
deliberation, he is not a good man, according to 
43. Macbeth, I, 7, 1-2. 
44. Hamlet, III, 1, 81. 
l----------------------------------------------~ 
Elizabethan standards. If a man does anything without 
considering upon it, he is not to be called virtuous. 
He must give the judgment time to pass upon it before 
he acts. Shakespeare's good men, rather than finding 
in conscience a hindrance to brave deeds, as do the 
villains, rely upon it to make them moderate, but withal 
strong and courageous. Oxford, in Richard l!l finds 
that his conscience helps him to advance bravely against 
his enemy. 
:Every man's conscience is a 
thousand men to fight ag~inst 
that bloody homicide. 45. 
Malcolm, also, indicates his realization of the power 
of deliberation to prevent rash and wicked deeds, when 
he says to Macduff, 
. And modest wisdom plucks me 
From over-credulous haste. 46. 
Richard III presents interesting problems of conscience. 
Richard belongs to the first of Charron's "classes of 
wicked men." He is perfectly incorporated with evil, 
and his very understanding approves the evil. Moulton 
says that Richard was evil for the sake of being 
evil. 47. He had built up carefully an assertion of 
individual will against the order of the universe. All 
o~dinary restraints he had learned to cast off-sympathy, 
45. Richard III, V, 2, 18-19. 
46. Macbeth, IV, 3, 120-121. 
47. R. G. Moulton, Moral System of Shakespeare, Macmillan 
Co. N. Y. 1903, pp. 43-44.·. 
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inherited affections, remorse; his position seemed 
impregnable. But he forgot that there are conditions 
under which the will is unable to act, and these are 
found, not in some remote combination of unlikely cir-
cwas~ances, but in the most commonplace of every-day 
conditions--sleep. During sleep, when his faculties are 
not under the control of his will, his conscience, kept 
so strictly in abeyance during his waking hours, and 
apparently dead, directs the procession of his victims, 
which appear and torture him with the remembrance of his 
wicked deeds. As each ghost appears and says in turn, 
"Let me sit heavy on thy soul tomorrow,1I and bids him 
despair, Richard's imagination, even in sleep, is 
roused against his will, and his conscience accuses him 
of the hatefulness of his crimes. When he awakes, he 
is unaole immediately to gain control of his imagination, 
and his conscience is still free to condemn him. Then 
follows the dialogue between his two selves--the sup-
pressed self of inherited humanity, and the artificial 
callousness so painfully built up. 
Have mercy, Jesut Softt I did but dream. 
o coward conscience, how dost thou afflict met 
The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight. 
Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh. 
What do I fear? myself? there's none else by: 
Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I. 
Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am; 
rrhen fly. What, from myself? Great reason, why: 
Lest I revenge. What, myself upon myself? 
I----------------------------...J 
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Alack, I love myself. 'Wherefore? for any good 
That I myself have done unto myself? 
0, no! I rather hate myself 
For hateful deeds committed by myself! 
I am a villain: yet I lie, I am not. 
Fool, of thyself speak well: fool, do not flatter. 
I',:y conscience hath a thousand several tongues, 
And every tongue brings in a several tale, 
And every tale condemns me fo~ a villain. 
Perjury, perjury, in the high'st degree; 
Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree; 
All several sins, all used in each degree, 
Throng to the bar, crying all, Guilty! guilty! 
I shall despair. There is no creature loves me; 
And if I die, no soul shall pity me: 
Nay, wherefore should they, since that I myself 
Find in myself no pity to myself? 
Methought the souls of all that I had murdertd 
Came to my tent; and everyone did threat 
Tomorrow's vengeance on the head of Richard." 48. 
Richard is an illustration of another Elizabethan 
theory of conduct--the agreement between outer circum-
stances and appearances, and inward morality. This theory 
came down from Plato, who taught that beauty of person 
should go with beauty of so~)l. Richard, because he was 
"curtailed of fair proportion, 
Cheated of feature by dis-
sembling nature 
Deform'd, unfinish'd 49. 
since he could not prove a lover, was determined to be-
come a villaj.n. Because Richard was born outside the 
pale of normal humanity, his trend was toward evil, 
since nature had already started him in that direction, 
and he franldy made choice of wickedness. His conscience 
48. Richard III, V, 3, 177-206. 
49. Ibid: I, 1, 18, 19. 
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would remain, as we have seen, under control of this 
wicked will, until the power of the will was removed. 
Queen Margaret, in pronouncing her fearful curse 
upon Richard, says also that he was, 
sealed in his nativity 
The slave of nature and the son of hellJ 
and she asks that the worm of conscience should begnaw 
his soul, and that his dreams should be disturbed with 
hideous visions. This curse, so fearfully fulfilled, 
was part of that theory of retribution which we find 
exemplified in the plays. 
A question that Moul ton suggests with regard to 
this retribution is that at first appearance it does 
not seem sufficiently spectacular to provide sufficient 
retribution for the many open crimes of Richard. It 
seems that he is permitted to die rather quietly, and 
is not held up to the scorn of his enemies. Moulton 
explains the justice of this by saying that a spectacu-
lar death would have been a moment's pang and all would 
have been over, but as it was~ the death that he suf-
fered was neither quick and showy eno'J.gh to give to his 
memory the added distinction of bravery, nor slow enough 
to arouse the sympathy of the reader. We are left to 
50. Ibid: I, 3, 225-226. 
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conjecture the manner of his death, and the tortures 
of conscience which must have overwhelmed him at 
the end. 
The Renaissance idea of tragedy--the justice which 
must inhere in the fall of princes, if there is a God 
of justice--is exemplified in Richard by the uneasy 
conscience which will not let him sleep in peace, and 
by the error which caused him to bring down evil upon 
himself. He is a true example of Renaissance villain, 
one who is so by free choice, who loves evil as a re-
comgense for the lack of love which he finds in his 
fellow men, and whose will is so perverted that it is 
in perfect accord with passion,--who can feel no re-
morse which will bring about repentance and amendment, 
but who suffers, nevertheless, the intense pangs of a 
trou.bled and abused conscience. 
The character of Richmond gives us an example of 
another sort of conscience, that "clear and good con-
science" which Charron praises as the 
source of wonderful strength and 
assurance, and of a happy tranqu~llity of 
spirit. 51. 
In his sleep the ghosts of Richard's victims address 
51. See Note 34. 
Richmond as "Quiet, untroubled soul", and promise 
that God and good angels will fight on his side; and 
upon waking, he tell his friends that he has had 
the sweetest sleep and fairest boding 
dreams 
That ever enter1d in a drowsy head. 52. 
He has the peace of a good conscience, and even in 
sleep his imagination, governed strongly by reason dur-
ing his waking hours, is kept under control. Richard, 
on the contrary, is tormented in sleep by the imagination 
which he has made subservient to his wicked passions 
while his will was able to control it. 
An example of the power of passion upon conscience 
is found in the quick conversion of Anne to the side of 
Richard. As Richard himself says: 
I, that kill'd her husband and his 
father, 
To take her in her heart's extremest hate, 
With curses in her mouth, tears in her eyes, 
The bleeding witness of her hatred by; 
Having God, her conscience, and these bars 
against me, 
And I nothing to back my suit at all 
But the plain devil and dissembling looks, 
And yet to win her, all the world to nothingl 53. 
The passions of the Lady Anne are immediately and 
violently roused by the flattery of Richard, and the 
will, turning aside from the sovereign reason to which 
R2. Richard III, 5, 3, 227-228. 
53. li!.~~ici TIl, 1, 2, 231-239. 
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rr \ it owes allegiance, and from which it will derive the 
greatest good, becomes an ally to the passions, and Anne 
through her own act is made another victim of Richard. 
In Clarence, in Richard III, we find an illustration 
of another of Charron's "three sorts of wicked men." He 
acknowledges, when he has been frightened by his fearful 
dream, that he has committed all the crimes of which he 
is accused in sleep, and he repents. La Primaudayets 
theory that the furies which torment wicked men are merely 
the torments of a guilty conSCience, is also illustrated 
here, when 
came wandering by 
A shadow like an angel, with bright hair 
Dabbled in blood; and he squeak'd out aloud, 
"Clarence is come; false, fleeting, perjured Clarence, 
That stabb'd me in the field of Tewksbury; 
Seize on him, Furries, take him to your torments!" 54. 
The play of Richard II, offers some striking examples 
of the Renaissance theory of retribution--that Heaven 
always defends the right, and punishes the guilty by the 
tortures of conscience. This is true in the case of 
Richard, whom his courtiers refUse to punish for Glouces-
ter's death, but who assures the duchess that heaven will 
revenge. 
But since correction lieth in those 
hands 
\Vhich made the fault that we cannot correct, 
54. Richard III, I, 4, 53-57. 
Put we our quarrel to the wil~ of heaven. 55. 
Gaunt refuses to avenge Gloucester's death, because 
he has so great respect for "the divinity that hedges a 
king", that he may not raise his hand against him, but 
promises the duchess that her husband's death will indeed 
be avenged: 
God's in the quarrel; for God's substitute, 
His deputy anointed in His sight, 
Hath caus'd his death: the ~ich if wrongfully, 
Let heaven revenge; for I may never lift 
An angry arm against His minister. 56. 
This idea of the "divinity" of a king is further 
emphasized after the death of Richard, who, although he 
had been deposed, had still about him the aura of king-
ship. His executioner, Exton, was "stricken with the 
prick of a guilty conscience" although he had been commis-
sioned to perform the deed by the highest authority of the 
land. 
o would the deed were good! 
For now the devil, that told me I did well, 
Says that this deed is chronicled in hell. 57. 
This peculiar expression with regard to the devil, implies 
the doctrine sometimes expressed of a good and an evil 
conscience; the good conscience inspiring to virtuous 
deeds, and the evil, to wicked deeds. 
55. Richard II, I, 2, 4-6. 
56. Ibid: I, 2, 37-39. 
57. Ibid: V, 5, 115-117. 
Richard II dies considering himself a severely 
wronged and innocent man. He has reasoned himself into 
the belief so generally accepted in medieval times that 
"the king can do no wrong ll • He is the contrary of those 
villains who reason themselves into evil, with the direct 
intent of committing evil for its own sake, as in Richard 
III. 
-
In Measure for Measure, a play which, according to 
Coleridge, is the central expression of Shakespeare's 
moral judgments, the character of Angelo gives a striking 
example of the conscience suddenly transformed by passion. 
Shakespeare wrote this playas a protest against the narrow 
and fanatical Puritanism which hated his art, and which 
condemned and punished inexorably all human frailties, 
especially those of the flesh. The play is an expression 
of Shakespeare's wrath against moral hypocrisy and self-
righteousness. Still Angelo is not a thorough, natural 
hypocrite; he is an excellent illustration of the power 
of passion to upset even the most firmly established moral 
jUdgments. Angelo is a self-deceiver. He sincerely thinks 
that he is what he appears to be. He is amazed and con-
founded at the sudden passion which the presence of Isabel 
awakens in him. He is one of that type of wicked men who 
are surprised into wickedness, according to Charron. His 
mind is not settled and grounded in sin; rather he sets 
t------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
himself up as a pattern and enforcer of virtue. He for-
gets that he himself is frail, and is so proud that he 
thinks he is beyond the reach of temptation. When Isabel 
appears before him, and demands of him: 
Go to your bosom: 
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth 
know 
That's like my brother's fault: if it confess 
A natural guiltiness such as is his, 
Let it not sound a thought u~on your tongue 
Against my brother's life. 58. 
Angelo, who has been suddenly aroused by her virtue and 
beauty, says aside, 
She speaks, and 'tis 
Such sense, that my sense breeds with it. 59. 
acknowledging to himself that his sense--that is, his 
senses, are inflamed by her. When she has left him, he 
exclaims against the temptation that has so overwhelmed 
him, making him yield to desires which he had before 
scorned, thinking that his lofty virtue was beyond the 
reach of such solicitations. His pride and his hypocrisy 
were his downfall. 
From thee,--even from thy virtue! 
What's this, what's this? Is this her fault or 
mine? 
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most? 
Hal 
Not she; nor doth she tempt: but it is I 
That, lying by the violet in the sun, 
Do, as the carrion does, not as the flower, 
Corrupt with virtuous season. 60. 
58. Measure for Measure, II, 2, 138-141. 
59. Ibid: 142-143. 
60. IbId: II, 2, 162-170. 
~Vhat, do I love her, 
That I desire to speak to her again, 
And feast upon her eyes? vVhat is't I dream on? 
o cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint, 
With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous 
Is that temptation that doth goad us on 
To sin in loving virtue. 61. 
The above lines show how completely Angelo is under 
the influence of passion. His conscience makes a correct 
pronouncement, but his will is under the control of his 
passions rather than his reason, and he, who was proud 
of his virtue, becomes sinful. He says again: 
I have begun, 
And now I give my sensual race the rein: 
Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite. 62. 
His sensual appetites have entirely taken possession of 
him. When Isabel says to the Duke: 
He would not, but by gift of my chaste 
body 
To his concupiscible intemperate lust, 
Release my brother; 63. 
She uses language appropriate to the psychology of the 
time, in placing lust among the concupiscible passions, as 
is done by all medieval and Renaissance philosophers. 
Another proof of Angelo's not possessing the conscience 
of a villain, but one that accuses him to his own great 
shame and confusion, and proves that he is one of those 
wicked men who are sinful because of weakness, and not 
61. Ibid: II, 2, 176-183. 
62. Ibid: II, 4, 159-161. 
63. Ibid: V, 1, 97-99. 
from choice, is his evident sorrow when he accuses him-
self to the Duke: 
o my dread lord, 
I should be guiltier than my guiltiness~ 
To think I can be undiscernible, 
When I perceive your Grace, like power divine 
Hath look'd upon my passes. Then, good prince, 
No longer session hold upon my shame, 
But let my trial be mine O\vn confession. 64. 
In contrast to the hypocrisy and self-conceit of Angelo, 
which leads to his judgment being subjugated to his pas-
sions,--is Isabel, a 
thing ensky'd and sainted. 65 . 
as Lucio calls her. 
Her moral judgment is absolutely in control of her 
will, her sense of justice is so keen and her passions 
so well under control, that she is immoveable in her dig-
nity and beauty of character. Her conscience is one which, 
as Charron says, 
does inspire men with wonderful strength 
and assurance; and is a mighty stay, and de-
fence, and support, in all manner of contin-
gencies. 66. 
Her reserve and modesty make her hesitate to appear before 
Angelo as a suppliant for her brother's life. 
Isabel Alas! What poor ability's in me 
To do him good? 
64. Ibid: V, 1, 370-376. 
65. Ibid: I, 4, 34. 
66. See Note 34. 
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Lucio Assay the power you have. 
ISi.i"bel My power? Alas, I doubt, __ 67. 
But as soon as Lucio convinces her that her duty is to 
help her brother, she consents to appeal to Angelo. She 
is in full control of her body and its passions, and 
Angelo's wicked solicitations have no effect upon her. 
In the Juliet of Measure for Measure, we find a 
conscience v~ch has been suddenly and completely over-
come by passion, and which repents as completely. 
Prov: Look, here comes one: a gentlewoman 
of mine, 
~fuo, falling in the flaws of her own 
youth, 
Hath b1ister'd her report. 68. 
We have here, also, an example of the effect of passion 
upon youth. As 1Nright says, 
The concupiscible passions are those 
which are prone to gain control of youth, 
while the irascible passions belong more 
properly to age. 69. 
The Duke, disguised as a Friar, calls upon Juliet to re-
pent of her sin: 
Duke 
Jul. 
Duke 
Jul. 
Repent you, fair one, of the sin you 
carry? 
I do; and bear the shame most patiently. 
I'll teach you how you shall arraign 
your conscience, 
And try your penitence, if it be sound, 
Or hollowly put on. 
I'll gladly learn. 
67. Measure for Measure, I, 4, 76-79. 
68. Ibid: II, 3, 10-12. 
69. See Note 17. 
Duke 
Jul. 
Duke 
Jul. 
Duke 
Jul. 
Duke 
Jul. 
Duke 
Love you the man that wrong'd you? 
Yes, as I love the woman that wrongtd 
him. 
So then, it seems your most offenceful 
act 
Was mutually committed? 
Mutually. 
Then was your sin of heavier kind than his? 
I do confess it, and repent it, father. 
'Tis meet so, daughter: but lest you do 
repent, 
As that the sin hath brought you to this 
shame, 
Which sorrow is always toward ourselves, 
not heaven, 
Showing we would not spare heaven as we 
love it, 
But as we stand in fear,--
I do repent me, as it is an evil, 
And take the shame with joy. 
There rest. 70. 
Here we have a perfect picture of the Catholic doctrine 
of sovereign contrition for sin--sorrow because we know 
we have offended God, rather than for any personal or in-
terested motive. Shakespeare may not have been a Catholic, 
but his ethical and religious teachings are nearly always 
in perfect accord with Catholic teaching. 
Here also, is en illustration of Shakespeare's atti-
tude toward sins of weakness, in contrast with maliciously 
premeditated or unnatural sins. As J. Courtenay James says, 
in an article on "Religion in Shakespeare ll , 
Sin is never belittled, much less condoned 
by Shakespeare. It is noticeable that sns of 
ingratitude, selfishness and worldliness are 
70. Measure for Measure, II, 3, 19-35. 
~--------------------------------------~ 
particularly condemned. In Shakespeare's 
ethics, deeds which are the product of strong 
impulse are more pardonable than premeditated 
actions of fraudulence and hypocritical profes-
sions of generosity. Our Lord knew what was in 
man, and He judged by the inwardness of moralib1_ 
Shakespeare also knew what was in man, and he 
judged as did Our Lord. 71. 
Among Shakespeare's villains, those who did evil from 
free choice, and who were so steeped in sin that their con-
sciences were almost ~une to remorse, one remarkable ex-
ample is the Queen in King Henry VI. It is very seldom 
that Shakespeare's women have not some redeeming qualities, 
but Margaret is an embodiment of all the crimes and vices 
of the age in which she lives. She ridicules her king's 
piety and peaceable nature and becomes herself worse and 
worse. She is shamless in her sinful life, and it is im-
possible to discover evidence that she feels any torments 
of conscience. As an example of the villain who sins for 
the sake of evil, Margaret is almost an equal of Richard III. 
In the same play there is a striking passage illustra-
ting the terrors of a conscience hardened in sin to such a 
degree that the sinner dies impenitent. Cardinal Beaufort 
is dying, and the fiend approaches to carry his soul to hell: 
Ah, what a sign it is of evil life, 
Where death's approach is seen so terrible. 
71. J. Courtenay James, "Religion in Shakespeare", in 
London Quarterly Review, Vol. 155, April 31, pp. 239-49. 
--
-
Warvlick 
Cardinal 
Warwick 
King 
Beaufort, it is thy sovereign speaks 
to thee. 
Bring me unto my trial when you will. 
Died he not in his bed? where Should 
he die? 
Can I make men live, whether they will 
or no? 
0, torture me no more! I will confess. 
Alive again? then show me where he is: 
I'll give a thousand pounds to lool\: 
upon him. 
He hath no eyes, the dust hath blinded 
them. 
Comb down his hair; look, look! it 
stands upright, 
Like lime twigs set to catch my winged 
soul. 
o thou eternal mover of the heavens, 
Look w.ith a gentle eye upon this wretch! 
o beat away the busy, meddling fiend 
That lays strong siege unto this wretch's 
soul, 
And from his bosom purge this black des-
pair. 72. 
So bad a death argues a monstrous life. 
Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all. 73 • 
In the same play occurs a passage which illustrates well 
the peace and strength that a good conscience imparts: 
King Vihat stronger breastplate than a heart 
untainted! 
Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel 
just, 
And he but naked, though lock'd up in 
steel, 
vVhose conscience with injustice is corrupted. 74. 
Cardinal Wolsey, in Henry VIII, is one of those 
wicked men whom we find in Shakespeare, and in life, who 
72. J-I Henry 11, III, 3, 5-23. 
73. Ibid: 30-31. 
74. Ibid: III, 2, 232-235. 
have lived in absolute disregard of the demands of con-
science until the loss of preferment or some other mis-
fortune causes them to give thought to the vanity of 
earthly pride and ambition. Wolsey is an arrogant, schem-
ing churchman, pitiless and double-dealing; but when mis-
fortune comes upon him, he sees his guilt and turns to 
God. Before he knows that the king has found him out, he 
flatters him, and makes false pledges of loyalty and ser-
vice. 
Wolsey Though all the world should crack their 
duty to you, 
And throw it from their soul; though 
perils did 
Abound, as thick as thought could make 
'em, and 
Appear in forms more horrid--yet my duty, 
As doth a rock against the chiding flood, 
Should the approach of this wild river 
break, 
And stand unshaken yours. 75. 
The king gives him the packet of papers which has fallen 
into the royal possession, and Wolsey knows that he is 
undone. The realization of the futility of human ambition 
comes upon him, and he is convinced that he has been most 
foolish to 
hang on princes' favors. 76. 
and he thanks the king for taking from his shoulders a 
load would sink a navy, too much honor. 77. 
75. Henry VIII, III, 2, 193-198. 
76. Henry VIII, III, 2, 367. 
77. Ibid: III, 2, 383. 
\Vhen he is disgraced he busies himself for the little 
remaining time of his life in making his peace with God. 
1,'Jhen Cromwell asks him how he dues he replies: 
Why, well; 
Never so truly happy, my good Cromwell. 
I know myself now; and I feel within me 
A peace above all earthly dignities, 
A still and quiet conscience. 78. 
The self-accusing conscience, which judges correctly, 
without any influence from passion, but is in fear of 
God's judgments, is expressed in the familiar words: 
Wolsey 0 Cromwell, Cromwell! 
Had I but served my God with half 
the zeal 
I served my king, he would not in 
mine age 
Have left me naked to mine enemies. 79. 
Shakespeare in the same play gives us an illustration 
of the peace of a good conscience in Buckingham, who is 
executed for treason because of the hatred of Wolsey. At 
his trial, for an instant, as one of the Gentlemen says: 
First Gent. ---he was stirred 
With such an agony, he sweat 
extremely, 
And something spoke in choler, 
ill and hasty. 
But he fell to himself again, 
and sweetly 
In all the rest show'd a most 
noble patience. 80. 
Buckingham is moved to choler, and his physical 
78. Ibid: 376-379. 
79. Ibid: 454-457. 
80. Henry VIII, II, 1, 32-36. 
constitution bears witness to it, but as soon as he re-
covers from this almost involuntary feeling of anger, he 
exhibits the resignation and quiet courage which are the 
marks of a conscience at peace with God. 
Buckingham The law I bear no malice for my 
death; 
'T has done upon the premises but 
justice; 
But those that sought it I could 
wish more Christians; 
Be what they will, I heartily for-
give 'em. 81. 
And again, his resignation is beautifully expressed in the 
following words: 
Buckingham Pray for me! I must now forsake ye; 
the last hour 
Of my long weary life is come upon me. 
Farewell: 
And when you would say something that 
is sad, 
Speak how I fell. I have done; and 
God forgive me. 82. 
This attitude toward death--accepting it with resig-
nation, or as in the case of Cardinal Beaufort, meeting 
it in terrible despair, but in no case with a joyful 
looking forward to a life beyond the grave--is character-
istic of all Shakespeare's characters. In this instance 
as in many others, Shakespeare is distinctly human and 
natural; there is very little of supernatural motive in 
delineations of character. As Taylor says~ 
81. Ibid: 62-64. 
92. Ibid: 131-136. 
~--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
When he crosses the plain of death, it 
is but to portray the effect of the imminence 
or contemplation of death upon the human mind 
engaged with mortal aims or perceiving their 
nUllity. 83. 
In another place, he says: 
It was a time when the energies, passions, 
ambitions, of eager men threatened to submerge 
the mystic anticipation of a life to come. No 
joyful anticipation of the bliss of heaven is 
expressed in Shakespeare. In plays as well as 
sonnets, he has no love of death, but detests 
it, along with all the 'wastes of t~e' and 
time's thievish progress to eternity. Dismally 
death's injurious approaches sap the beauty and 
wit of woman, and man's strength and glory. 
Reconcilement to the fatal necessity and a seemly 
end, are the most that can be expected. 84. 
This idea that a IIseemly end ll is what is to be desired 
may be at the bottom of Wolsey's repentance and Bucking-
ham's forgiveness of his enemies, but if one is to accept 
the evidence of many other characters in Shakespeare, it 
is more probable that he intended to portray the effect 
of conscience upon a man as he is brought face to face with 
death; or to illustrate the end of the "just man and the 
sinner." 
A villain who seems in the early part of the play to 
be without conscience, but who repents most deeply later, 
is Iachimo in Cymbeline. He is a type of villain that 
seems to be so naturally, as an effect of the climate in 
which he was reared. The Southern nature in Shakespeare's 
83. Taylor, op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 257-258. 
84. Ibid: pp. 257-258. 
r 
characters is represented as -ardent and violent. Their 
passions are easily aroused. 
Iachimo is evil-minded, naturally wicked, and he 
tempts Posthumous to lay the wager upon his wife's fidel-
ity, with a fiendish trickery and delight that argues his 
entire lack of moral integrity. He carries out this plan 
in the same spirit, and returns to gloat over his victory 
to Posthumous. He swears by all that he should hold sacred 
that he is telling the truth, and one finds it difficult 
to believe that he will ever repent. By a change of for-
• 
tune Iachimo is brought a prisoner to the court of Cym-
beline, and he confesses most humbly the crime of which 
he was guilty. His conscience, which one might suppose 
was entirely silenced in him, torments him so much with 
the concealed crime, that he is glad "to be constrained 
to utter that which torments him to conceal." As he tells 
the story of his villainy, he gives an explanation of his 
actions in Britain, which agrees closely with the teach-
ings of Elizabethan psychology with regard to the close 
relationship of climate to conduct. 
Away to Britain 
Post I in this design; well may you, sir, 
Remember me at court, where I was taught 
Of your chaste daughter the wide difference 
'Twixt amorous and villainous. Being thus 
quench'd 
Of hope, not longing, mine Italian brain 
'Gan in your duller Britain operate 
l",-------------------------: 
r---------:------------. 
Most vilely. 85. 
Iachimo's sudden and complete conversion is in line 
with Elizabethan belief that external influences have a 
remarkable effect upon conduct. 
Posthumous' conduct is nearly as reprehensible to a 
modern mind as that of Iachimo. It seems impossible that 
a man of any depth of character could so easily fall a 
victim to the wiles of a villain such as Iachimo, and be-
lieve him in such a matter. It is probable that his cred-
iting of the circumstantial evidence which Iachimo presents, 
is the direct result of his being so confident before, of 
his wife's fidelity. His confidence is shaken and changed 
immediately into distrust. His remorse and repentance at 
the end of the play are as great as his rage when he saw 
Iachimo with the tell-tale bracelet. Posthumous was so 
greatly moved by rage that he ordered his servant to put 
to death the wife whom he dearly loved; but when his pas-
sions are cooled, and his judgment is ruled by calm reason 
he repents bitterly of his deed. He represents his con-
science as being imprisoned by guilt, as he is imprisoned 
in his physical person, and he desires to be freed from 
the imprisonment of a guilty conscience, even by death if 
that is necessary. 
Post. Most welcome, bondage! for thou art 
85. Cymbeline, V, 5, 191-198. 
a way, 
I think, to liberty: yet am I better 
Than one that's sick 0' the gout; since he had 
rather 
Groan so in perpetuity 
By the sure physician, 
To unbar these locks. 
fetter'd 
than be cured 
death, who is the key 
My conscience, thou art 
More than my shanks and wrists: you good gods, 
give me 
The penitent instrument to pick that bolt. 
Then, free forever! Is't enough I am sorry? 
So children temporal fathers do appease; 
Gods are more full of mercy. Must I repent? 
I cannot do it better than in gyves. 86. 
After Posthumous is freed from prison, and Iachimo has 
confessed his crime, Posthumous is more enraged against 
himself than against Iachimo. His words express the 
greatest sorrow and repentance: 
Ay me! most credulous fool, 
Egregious murderer, thief, anything 
That's due to all the villains past; in being, 
To come! 0 give me cord, or knife, or poison, 
Some upright justicer! Thou, king, send out 
For tortures ingenious: it is I 
That all the abhorred things 0' the earth amend 
By being worse than they. I am Posthumous, 
That kill'd thy daughter: villain-like, I he; 
That caused a lesser villain than myself, 
A sacrilegious thief~ to do it. The temple 
Of virtue was she. 8"t. 
Posthumous proves most conclusively La Primaudaye1s 
argument with regard to those whose heart and will deceive 
them in the choice and election of that which is good, by 
following reason and judgment corrupted, and thus they 
86. Ibid: V, 4, 4-14. 
87. Ibid: V, 5, 210-220. 
are led to embrace their error. 88 • He is also an example 
of a tragic hero, who, as Miss Campbell says, sins under 
the influence of passion, his reason failing to check his 
passion. 
Among the comedies we find numerous illustrations of 
Shal{espeare's theories with regard to conscience--if we may 
say that he had any definite theories in this regard. At 
any rate, there are many examples of the Elizabethan con-
ception of the conscience, and of the effects upon the 
individual of the self-accusing conscience or of the con-
science that is at ease. The play just discussed comes 
under the classification of comedy, though it is one of a 
"happy ending." In the Winter's Tale, a comedy of the 
'. 
same period, and in much the same vein, we have another 
remarkable example of sin and repentance. Leontes does 
not need a villain from a strange country to convince him 
of his wife's infidelity, but his own mad jealousy makes 
him take as proofs of guilty affection the courtesies and 
kindnesses which his queen bestows upon his friend, a guest 
at the court. Leontes' repudiation of Hermione, and his 
public accusation of her are almost beyond the bounds of 
possibility. The sudden conversion of the king, when the 
death of his son causes him to acknowledge that he has 
blasphemed the god Apollo, by not believing the oracle, 
88. See Note 36. 
-is also at first sight most unnatural. But this is char-
acteristic of the psychology of the times, which pictures 
the conscience as being swayed very suddenly by an emotion 
which might become predominant on the instant. 
Leontes Apollo's angry; and the heavens 
themselves 
Do strike at my injustice.8g. 
Leontes Apollo, pardon 
My great profaneness 'gainst thine 
oracle! 
I'll reconcile me to Polixenes 
New woo my queen, recall the good 
Camillo, 
Whom I proclaim a man of truth, of 
mercy. 90. 
In speaking of his wronged friend, he says, expressing his 
great remorse: 
How he glisters 
Through my rus t ! and how his piety 
Does my deeds make the blackerJ 91. 
\~en he thinks his queen is dead he expresses still greater 
grief and remorse: 
Prithee bring me 
To the dead bodies of my queen and son: 
One grave shall be for both: upon them 
shall 
The causes of their death appear, unto 
Our shame perpetual. 92. 
Hermione's steadfastness under her afflictions and 
89. Winter's Tale, III, 3, 145-146. 
90. Ibid: III, 2, 155-159. 
91. Ibid: III, 2, 171-173. 
92. Ibid: III, 2, 236-240. 
ber fearless defence of her character, are proofs of her 
quiet and easy conscience. In her dignified and calm 
defence before the king, she declares her innocence, and 
calls her lord himself to witness to the purity of her 
life and her conscience: 
Hermione Since what I am to say must be but 
that 
\~ich contradicts my accusation and 
The testimony on my part no other 
But what comes from myself, it shall 
scarce boot me 
To say 'not guilty'; mine integrity 
Being counted falsehood, shall, as I 
express it 
Be so received. But thus: if powers 
divine 
Behold our human actions, as they do, 
I doubt not then but innocence shall 
make 
False accusation blush and tyranny 
Tremble at patience. You, my lord, 
best know, 
~Y.ho least will seem to do so, my 
past life 
Hath been as continent, as chaste, 
as true, 
As I am now unhappy. 93. 
In the old Lord Camillo, Shakespeare gives us a 
splendid example of that perfect courtier whom Castiglione 
characterizes in his Book of the Courtier, as, 
an honest, a faire, condicioned man, and 
of an upright conscience. 94. 
His honesty is so apparent, even to the stranger king 
Polixenes, that the latter does not hesitate to appeal to 
93. Winter's T~le, III, 2, 23-36. 
94. Hoby, Thomas, The Book of ~ Courtier, from the 
Italian of Count Baldassare Castiglione, 1561, London, 
900 
, 
; 
him for enlightenment and help in the perplexity into 
which Leontes' treatment has thrown him. 
In the pastoral comedy As You Like It, Shakespeare 
gives us another remarkable illustration of sudden conver-
sion in Oliver, whose hatred of his young brother would 
almost lead him to murder him, but who is so influenced 
by the exterior circumstances of quiet and solitude that 
his passion is subdued, and he confesses his sin openly: 
Oliver I do not shame 
To tell you what I was, since my 
conversion 
So sweetly tastes, being the thing 
I am. 95. 
The finest picture of a contented conscience that can be 
found in Shakespeare is in Duke Senior of As You Like It. 
Duke S. Now my co-mates and brothers in 
exile, 
Hath not old custom made this life 
more sweet 
Than that of painted pomp? Are not 
these woods 
. More free from peril than the envious 
court? 96. 
The content and peace which are found in simple surround-
ings, when accompanied by a good conscience, are expressed 
in the familiar words: 
Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head; 
And this our life, exempt from public haunt, 
95. As You Like It, IV, 3, 135-138. 
96. Ibid: II, 3,1-4. 
~-------------------------------' 
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running 
brooks, 
Sermons in stones and good in everything. 97. 
The effect of exterior circumstances upon the moral judg-
ment is found in the Duke Frederick, who, while he is not 
pictl~ed as utterly debased and cruel, has committed the 
crime of usurping the place of his brother, and banishing 
his niece. lNhen he finds himself among the quiet shades 
and pleasant scenes of the Forest of Arden, away from the 
intrigues and conventionalities of the court, his conscience 
is touched with sorrow for his crime. 
Jaq. de B. And to the skirts of this wild 
wood he came; 
Where meeting with an old reli-
gious man, 
After some question with him, was 
converted 
Both from his enterprise and from 
the world. 98. 
One of the strongest arguments to prove the power of 
passion to overthrow reason and upset the power of moral 
judgment is found in Antony and Cleopatra. The oriental 
magnificence, the glow and color, the irresistable charm 
of the "serpent of old Nile" are fascinating. But despite 
the beauty of imagery which pervades the play and the 
charm of the characters, one can feel throughout that in 
this as in all the plays the moral laws that govern hmnan 
life and destiny are still paramount. As Dowden says, 
97. Ibid: I, 3, 12-16. 
98. Ibid: V, 4, 165-168. 
The worship of Cleopatra for Antony, and 
his for her, are destined to failure from the 
beginning. There could be no true confidence, 
no steadfast strength of love between them, 
because their love was built wholly upon exter-
nal fascination, and had no mutual confidence 
in it. 99. 
Antony is entirely under the sway of his passions, so much 
so that his reason is unhinged. Vihen he is away from Cleo-
patra, she for that time loses her power over him, and his 
moral judgment causes him to repent, and spurn her as his 
destroyer; but as soon as he finds himself again in her 
presence, her fascination for him again asserts itself, 
and his reason is again deposed in favor of his passion. 
Antony expresses in himself all the Elizabethan belief in 
the power of passion. 
The great Roman play which illustrates the Greek and 
Roman idea of conscience--the judgment of conduct based 
upon the relationship of man to the good of the state--is 
Coriolanus. Coriolanus based his moral judgments upon his 
duty to Rome. Moulton elucidates this in his chapter on 
tlRoman Life Dramatised," in Moral System of Shake speare. 
He says that Coriolanus is one of three Roman plays which 
illustrate the principle of the greatness and supremacy 
of the state, as opposed to the people. A compromise be-
tween the state--Coriolanus and the people--the tribune 
99. Dowden E., Shakespeare, American Book Co., 1878, 
p. 140. 
~ 
i and the plebeians--was attempted by Volumnia, who illus-
trates the spirit of compromise. It was not his over-
mastering pride, but his devotion to the state as a princi-
pIe, that brought about the greatness of Coriolanus' char-
acter, even though Volumnia herself named it pride. It 
was his acting against this principle that compassed his 
ruin. 
Coriolanus was ruled by the passion of pride, but 
more by his devotion to the state. The good of the state 
was to him the end of his moral actions, as God is the end 
of the morality of a Christian. When his aristocratic 
pride is outraged at the hands of the plebians he turns 
against the state, the object of his devotion, and joins 
the enemies of Rome. Coriolanus, by putting his private 
wrongs and vengeance before the good of Rome, sacrificed 
his moral principles, which were centered in patriotism. 
He is induced by his mother to renounce his private re-
venge, and give himself up to death for the cause of his 
country. Thus Coriolanus becomes, according ·to Roman 
ethics, a perfect member of the state. 
The same theory is exemplified in Julius Caesar, in 
the person of Brutus. From the viewpoint of modern ethics, 
Brutus commits a grevious sin of ingratitude and treachery 
when he turns against his friend, to whom he owes a great 
d.ebt of gratitude for the preferment he has given him; 
r but, according to the Roman standard of conduct, we must 
acknowledge that Brutus, in so far as he was sincere, was 
justified in the killing of Caesar. His words, "Not that 
I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more," would 
be the expression of his creed, lithe State before all 
elself--and if his conscience judged this to be the highest 
good, he would certainly be justified in carrying out 
whatever he thought would conduce to that end. 
Another play based upon life in pre-Christian times, 
and one which embodies the morality of the Greeks, is 
Troilus and Cressida. Shakespeare uses this old story for 
his own purposes and in his own way. He does not make 
Troilus ridiculous, and he pictures Cressida as utterly 
shameless and unattractive. It is a study in passion. 
The illicit love of Troilus and Cressida is not in Shake-
speare, any more than in Chaucer, the central crime of 
the story. The infidelity of Cressida is held up to 
scorn to a far greater extent than is the other crime. 
The doctrine of the will being led captive by the exterior 
senses, is clearly expressed in "Troilus' words, when he 
admits having fallen a victim to Cressida's charms: 
Troilus I take today a wife, and my election 
Is led on in the conduct of my will; 
Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous 
shores 
Of will and judgment. 100. 
__________ ~ ___________________ c ______ ___ 
100. Troilus and Cressida, II, 2, 61-65. 
Cressida acknowledges her infidelity and weakness in the 
words: 
Cressida Ah, poor our sex! this fault in us 
I find, 
The error of our eye directs our mind: 
~~at error leads must err: 0 then 
conclude 
Minds sway'd by eyes are full of 
turpitude. 101. 
The four plays vmich are almost universally considered 
the greatest of the great plays of Shakespeare,--Othello, 
King Lear, Macbeth,· and Hamlet,--afford in the consideration 
of conscience, as in nearly every other question, the wid-
est field of study. In these four plays one finds the 
most profound problems of morals and the greatest psycho-
logical study probably to be found in any work of artistic 
literature. These plays alone afford a complete summary 
of Shakespeare's treatment of moral responsibility. One 
finds here examples of all the teachings of Renaissance 
psychology wi th reference to conscience. 
Othello presents nearly as many unsolved problems as 
does Hamlet. The motives of rago1s villainy, the sudden 
degeneration of Othello, the extent of Emilia's responsi-
bility--all these present endless unanswerable questions. 
Iago has been presented in so many different ways by 
critics that it is difficult to make any decision of one's 
101. Ibid: V, 2, 108-110. 
r 
own in regard to him. By the elder critics, and by most 
of the present day critics also, he is considered one of 
those villains, like Richard III, who are artists in evil, 
choosing evil deliberately, usually to compensate for the 
lack of some pleasure or preferment or physical perfec-
tion of which they are painfully conscious. Brandes, in 
William Shakespeare, says: 
He is mischievousness personified. He 
does evil for the pleasure of hurting, and takes 
active delight in the adversity and anguish of 
others. He is that eternal envy which merit or 
success in others never fails to irritate. He 
is blear-eyed rancor itself, figuring as a great 
power, nay--as the motive force in human life. 
He embodies the detestation of others' excel-
lences which shows itself in obstinate disbelief, 
suspicion, or contempt; the instinct of hatred 
for all that is open, beautiful, bright, good 
and great. 
Elsewhere, in reading Shakespeare's mono-
logues, we learn what the person really is; 
even a villain like Richard III is quite honest 
in his monologues. Not so Iago. This demi-
devil is always trying to give himself reason 
for his malignity, is always half fooling him-
self by dwelling on half-motives, in which he 
partly believes, but disbelieves, in the main. 
Coleridge aptly designated this action of his 
mind: 'The motive-hunting of a motiveless ma-
ligni ty.' 102. 
This characterization of Iago is the usually accepted 
one. Shucking, in his "Motives for Action in Shakespeare's 
Playslt, quotes some of the nineteenth century German 
102. Brandes, George, William ShakesWeare, A Critical 
Study, in Two Volumes, London, Villiam Hennemann, 
1898, pp. 109-110. 
critics, among them Kreyssig, Ulrici, and Gervinus, as 
expounding this doctrine with regard to Iago. Kreyssig 
says that Iago tries to hide his own malignity from him-
self, as may be clearly recognized from his accusing his 
wife of infidelity, though he himself is more than half 
doubtful of this possibility. Gervinus and Ulrici agree 
in finding in Iago an unconscious tendency to persuade 
himself of valid reasons for his conduct, and thus to 
suppress any vague stirrings of conscience. 103. This 
last criticism implies a little deviation from the usually 
accepted early opinion--that Iago is a villain merely by 
choice. If he were, he would not find it necessary to 
seek reason for his wickedness--the very fact of his having 
deliberately chosen evil would imply that he had effectu-
ally stifled the voice of his conscience, at least so long 
as it was under the control of his will. 
Stopford Brooke states the difference between the 
earlier interpretations of lago and those generally ac-
cepted at the present time, in the following terse para-
graph: 
103. 
lago is raised by some writers into the repre-
sentation of almost absolute evil: a Satan in-
carnate, with a majesty of evil surrounding him, 
of which I think Shakespeare had no notion at 
all. He is again represented as a great artist 
« . 
L. L. Shucking, IIMotives for Action in Shakespeare's 
Playsll, in Character Problems in Shakespeare's Plays, 
Henry Holt, N. Y., 1922, p. 325. 
of evil, who is enthralled with the pleasure 
of his own artistry i:l;1 wiclcedness. I think 
these views are grossly exaggerated, and that 
Shakespeare would not accept them. There is 
no majesty in Iago. He is a low cunning beast. 
Nor is his intellect of a high character; it 
is- keen and subtle, partly of the fox, but there 
is nothing great about it. It enables him to 
disguise his real nature, to wear th~ mask of 
an honest man, of the bluff, open-speaking sol-
dier; but that kind of cleverness is not un-
common, and needs no special intelligence. His 
chief characteristics are self-love, sensuality, 
and cruelty. 104. 
Iago is a strange contradiction. At times he seems to 
declare his utter lack of conscientious scruples open~y, 
as when he says to Roderigo: 
Were I the Moor, I would not be Iago: 
In following him, I follow but myself; 
Heaven is my judge, not I for love and 
duty; 
But seeming so, for my peculiar end. 105. 
Again he appears to be making excuses, even to himself, 
for his crimes, and trying to find means of quieting the 
qualms of conscience, as when he says: 
Iago Though in the trade of war I have slain 
men, 
Yet do I hold it very stuff Of the con-
science 
To do contrivfd murder. I lack iniquity 
Sometimes to do me service. 106. 
Craig, in his notes on Othello, says t~t Coleridge 
104. Stopford Brooke, Ten More Plays of Shakespeare, 
p. 184, wndon, Constable, 1913. 
105. Othello, I, 1, 57-60. 
106. Ibid: I, 2, 1-5. 
~ ; based his famous line, "the motive-hunting of a motiveless 
-
maligni tylf, upon the passage in which I.ago seems deliber-
ately to search for sufficient reason for carrying out 
his diabolical plan. 
I, for mere suspicion in that kind, 
Will do as if for surety. He holds me well; 
The better shall my purpose work on him. 107. 
The Moor is 0 f a free and open nature, 
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so, 
And will as tenderly be led by the nose 
As asses are. 
I have't. It is engender 'd. Hell and night 
Must bring this monstrous birth to the world's 
light. 108. 
In the final lines of this speech another clue is 
given to the hardness of lago's conSCience, and his per-
sistence in evil. He chooses hell instead of heaven, and 
proclaims his allegiance to the devil. These final words 
may imply that he belongs to that third class of villains 
who choose evil merely for the sake of evil, without any 
reason. Craig says, however, that lago has personal mo-
tives, which he expresses more than once. 
His military record was good, and he deserved, so 
he thought, the position that had been given to Cassio. 
Also, although he does not believe the rumor concerning 
Othello and Emilia, he is determined to avenge the bare 
suspicion, inasmuch as it injures his reputation. lago's 
107. Othello, I, 3, 395-397. 
108. Ibid: 405-409. 
pride and jealousy are the motives that govern him and 
silence all conscientious scruples. 
Iago thinks evil of everyone. In his eyes no one 
is good. He has no scruples about imputing a grave crime 
to the spotless Desdemona. He thinks that all women are 
wantons, and does not hesitate to impute wickedness to 
his own wife. He says of women: 
Iago I know our country disposition well; 
In Venice they do let heaven see the 
pranks 
They dare not ahow their husbands; 
their best conscience 
Is not to leave't undone, but keep't 
unknown. 109. 
The character of Othello is one of the finest illus-
trations in Shakespeare of the effect of the passions upon 
the judgment, and also of the sudden and almost inexpli-
cable change in character and action brought about by 
exterior causes. Othello, in the beginning, manifests 
himself a man of caIn1 disposition, of unblemished honor, 
and of a quiet and untroubled conscience: 
Othello My parts, my title, and my perfect 
soul 
Shall manifest me rightly. 110. 
Even his enemy speaks of Othello in terms of praise: 
The Moor is of a free and open nature 
That thinks men honest that but seem 
to be so. 111. 
109. Ibid: III, 3" 202-205. 
110. Ibid: I, 2, 31-32. 
111. Ibid: I, 3, 405-406. 
r--------------------------------------~ 
Also: 
The Moor, howbeit that I endure him not 
Is of a constant, loving, noble nature. i12 . 
Othello is, as Iago says, of a free and noble nature; 
when Lodovico sees his treatment of Desdemona, he says: 
Is this tre nature 
vVhom passion could not shake? whose solid 
virtue 
The shot of accident, nor dart of chance, 
Could neither graze nor pierce? 113. 
This opinion of Othello's greatness of spirit is care-
fully built up from the opening of the play; and the 
contrast when he gives way completely to the passion of 
jealousy, is difficult to explain. 
A hint is given of the transformation to take place 
in Othello's behavior, in Act II, when Cassio and JiIontano 
have quarreled. 
othello My blood begins my safer guides to 
rule; 
And passion, having my best judgment 
collied, 
Assays to lead the way. 114. 
Some critics say that Shakespeare intended that we 
should believe that Othello had 
poured his treasure into foreign 
laps, 115. 
112. Ibid: II, 296-297. 
113. Ibid: IV, 1, 274-277. 
114. Ibid: II, 3, 205-208. 
115. Furness, Variormn, Othello, p. 422--quoted by 
Stoll, Othello, p. 2. 
-and that it was a guilty conscience that made him ,so 
easily convinced of Desdemona's guilt. Another argument 
is that his very trustfulness and love for his wife made 
him an easy prey to jealousy. Stoll's whole argument is 
against the study of Othello psychologically. He says 
that Shakespeare did not pretend to make a character psy-
chologically consistent. He wrote for the stage, and used 
the dramatic conventions Which he knew would be intelli-
gible to his audience, without regard to their psycholog-
ical significance. He says that the instilling of jeal-
ousy into a man's soul by a villain's wiles is an arbit-
rary but immemorial convention, and one that an Elizabethan 
audience could fully appreciate. Stoll says, 
With or without sexual jealousy, the conven-
tion of the calmnniator credited is one of the 
oldest traditions of the drama. The matter is 
everything, the manner nothing. 116. 
He says again, 
The dramatist leans on the dramatic conven-
tion of slander and 'diabolical soliciting' 
(which means here almost diabolical possession, 
not merely temptation). Othello is untainted, 
and yet is overwhelmed at his only vulnerable 
point, his trustfulness, by superhuman art. 117. 
However, the passion of jealousy may be interpreted 
as having entered into, and enslaved the mind and spirit 
116. 
117. 
Stoll, E. E., Othello, A Historical and Comparative 
Study, University of Minnesota, 1915, p. 6. 
Ibid: p. 17. 
-of Othello; when Iago has begun to work upon him, the 
images that he calls forth of Desdemona's wickedness and 
his ovm disgrace keep his passions so stirred up that his 
calm reasonable judgment is completely overthrown. His 
conscience is still extremely active, and shows itself in 
the end when he proves himself fully aware of the nature 
of his deed. Othello's moral judgments are suspended, 
but his conscience is active and trustworthy, and in the 
end asserts its supremacy. 118. 
Emilia is a character in which the conscience seems 
peculiarly absent. She has no qualms about stealing the 
handkerchief for her husband, and when she might have 
saved her mistress a great deal of suffering, she does 
not tell what she knows. She is truly devoted to Desdemona, 
however, and finally dies defending her. That Emilia's 
conscience is not likely to trouble her a great deal about 
the means she might use to attain a desired end, and that 
Desdemona's is so true and pure that she cannot endure the 
slightest suspicion to come near her, is sho\Vll in the con-
versation between the two, after Othello has accused Des-
demona of inconstancy. 
Des. Dost thou in conscience think, tell me, 
Ernilia,--
That there be women do abuse their husbands 
In such gross kind? 
118. See Craig, op.cit., p. 716. 
Emil. 
Des. 
:&nil. 
DeS:"" 
Emil. 
Des. 
:&nil. 
There be some such, no question. 
Wouldst thou do such a deed for all 
the world? 
Vfuy, would not you? 
No, by this heavenly light! 
Nor I, by this heavenly light; I 
might do't as well in the dark. 
Woulds't thou do such a deed for all 
the world? 
The world's e. huge thing: it is a 
great price 
For a small vice. 119. 
To Desdemona's purity of conscience the entire play 
bears witness. Her father says of her that she was, 
Brabantio A maiden never bold 
Of spirit so still and quiet that 
her motion 
Blush'd at itself. 120. 
He thinks that his daughter's judgment has been 
paralyzed by drugs or witchcraft, and thus her duty to 
him and her sense of fitness have been destroyed. 
Brabantio It is a judgment maim'd and most 
imperfect 
That will confess perfection so 
could err 
Against all rules of nature, and 
must be driven 
To find out practises of cunning 
hell, 
'\Nhy this should be. I therefore 
vouch again 
That with some mixtures powerful 
o'er the blood, 
Or with some dram conjur'd to this 
effect, 
He wrought upon her. 121. 
119. Othello, IV, 3, 61-69. 
120. Ibid: I, 3, 95-97. 
121. Ibid: I, 3, 99-106. 
~ I This Elizabethan doctrine of the power of supernatural 
-
forces in weakening moral responsibility is used over 
and over again in Othello. Of course in this particular 
instance, Othello refutes Brabantio by telling of his 
wooing of Desdemona by true and honorable means, and thus 
the imputation against Desdemona's character is contra-
dicted. 
Iago speaks in praise of her goodness even when he 
is plotting his diabolical schemes against her: 
So will I turn her virtue into pitch 
And out of her own goodness make the net 
That shall enmesh them all. 122. 
When the terrible plot has been worked out, and 
Othello has openly accused Desdemona of infidelity, she 
cannot bear even to repeat the name by Which he has called 
her. 
Des. 
Iago 
Des. 
Am I that name, Iago? 
~nat name, fair lady? 
Such as she says my lord did say I was. 123. 
vVhen Othello prepares to kill her, and tells her to 
reconcile herself with heaven and grace, since he would 
not kill her soul, she says that she does not know why 
she fears. 
Des. Why I should fear I know not 
Since guiltiness I know not, but yet 
feel I fear. 124. 
122. Ibid: II, 3, 366-369. 
123. Ibid: IV, 2, 117-119. 
124. Ibid: V, 2, 31-33. 
othello does not believe her, but we know, as he 
did not, how utterly guiltless she is. This is a con-
science in whiCh the reason is sovereign, and keeps her 
sovereignty even under the attack of the passion of grave 
fear. 
King Lear is essentially a tragedy of ingratitude, 
but as Miss Campbell says, it is more than that. It is 
a tragedy of anger against ingratitude. The entire play 
is built around this theme. The ingratitude of Lear's 
elder daughters is the motivating action, but beyond that 
we have the righteous indignation of Kent protesting 
against his master's deed, Albany against his wife, and 
Edmund, and Cordelia and the King of France fighting for 
the restitution of Lear. The play is pagan in its setting 
and details. 125. Wilson Knight makes the following state-
ment: 
Lear is a symbolic pattern of human affairs 
exactly correspondent to any philosophy which is 
limited to a strict naturalism, pessimistic but 
stoic. It is bleak, colorless, limited, natural-
istic. Hence, it is pagan through and through. 
In ~ our vision is constricted to the earth. 126. 
Hardin Craig, in contradiction of Knight's argument, says 
that, although the play is pagan, it is interpreted by 
Christian philosophy. He says that the four moral virtues 
125. Campbell, op.cit., p. 200. 
126. Knight, Wilson, "Macbeth and Antony and Cleopatra", 
The Imperial Theme, Oxford U. Press, 1931. 
are the theme upon which the play is based, the outstand-
ing principal basis of the plot being the virtue of pru-
dence. These virtues were especially honored by the old 
philosophers, and were defined and applied by st. Thomas. 
In Aristotle the virtue of prudence is tne groundwork and 
source of all other virtues. Upon the observance or non-
observance of the virtue of prudence the entire moral 
system of this play is built. It also emphasizes the 
enormity of crimes against nature. The foolish imprudence 
of Lear is the great error which forms the motivating ac-
tion of the play; and the base ingratitude of the elder 
daughters and the wickedness of Edmund are the crimes 
against nature which upset the established order. 
King Lear's sin lay in his pride and in his stubborn 
resistance to any suggestion from his courtiers that Cor-
delia was true. It was his vanity· and pride that caused 
him to repudiate Cordelia because she would not flatter 
him. His conscience was hardened against her, and later 
on in the play, when misfortunes had come thick upon him, 
and he began to repent, he acknowledged that he had been 
unkind and selfish with regard to the poor in his kingdom. 
Lear 
.............. 
Poor naked wretches, wheresoe'er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless 
storm, 
How shall your houseless heads and ·unfed 
sides, 
Your loopfd and window'd raggedness, defend 
you 
r __ -----------------------------------------------------. 
From seasons such as these? 0, I have ta'en 
Too little care of this. 127. 
Lear is religious. His devotion to the gods and his 
acknowledgment of their providence is evident throughout 
the play. When he realizes his crime against his youngest 
daughter, he confesses his error in words that indicate 
clearly the relationship that judgment and passion bear to 
moral responsibility: 
Lear ° most small fault 
How ugly dids't thou in Cordelia show! 
That, like an engine, wrench'd my frame 
of nature, 
From the fix'd place; drew from my heart 
all love, 
And added to the gall. ° Lear, Lear, Learl 
Beat at this gate, that let thy folly in, 
And thy dear judgment out. 128. 
Just before he loses control of his passions and his judg-
ment in madness, he acknowledges the power of the gods, 
their control over the conscience of men, and their justice 
in punishing the guilty, when he says: 
Let the great gods 
That keep this dreadful pother o'er our heads, 
Find out their enemies now. Tremble, thou wretch, 
That hast within thee undivulged crimes, 
Unwhipp'd of justice: hide thee, thou bloody hand; 
Thou perjur'd, and thou simular of virtue 
That art incestuous: caitiff, to pieces shake, 
That under covert and convenient seeming 
Hast practis'd on man's life: close pent-up guilts, 
Rive your concealing continents, and cry 
These dreadful summoners grace.--I am a man 
More sinn'd against than sinning. 129. 
127. King Lear, III, 4, 27-31. 
128. Ibid: I, 4, 287-294. 
129. IbId: III, 2, 49-59. 
\Vhen Lear is completely mad, of course he has no 
more responsibility for his actions, his conscience is 
not under his control--that is, its action is suspended, 
and he abandons his faith in the justice of the gods. 
vYhy, thou wert better in thy grave, than 
to answer 
With thy uncovered body this extremity of the 
skies. 
Is man no more than this?-----Off, off, you 
lendingsl 130. 
When Cordelia has returned, and Lear struggles back 
to partial sanity, he tries to make amends to his youngest 
daughter, and accompanies her joyfully to prison: 
Come, let's away to prison: 
We two alone will sing like birds i' 
When thou dost ask me blessinl$~ I'll 
And ask of thee forgiveness. ~vl. 
the cage; 
kneel down 
And when Cordelia dies, King Lear's grief and despair 
drive him back into insanity. Lear's conscience is ruled 
by the passions of pride and vanity, and because of his 
fatal lack of prudence, he allows his enemies to gain con-
trol of his kingdom and to overthrow his reason. He has 
no calm moral judgment, although he is religious. His sin 
is not one of malice. It is indeed true that he was a man 
"more sinn'd against than sinning." 
The villains of the play illustrate two types of vil-
lain recognized by Elizabethan psychology. The sisters, 
130. Ibid: III, 4, 105-107, 115. 
131. Ibid: V, 1, 7-10. 
Regan and Goneril, are among the few women of Shakespeare 
that are entirely wicked, almost more so than human nature 
will allow. They are villains who are so of their own 
choice. They have no redeeming qualities. Nowhere is any 
hesitancy in evil manifested, whether caused by qualms of 
conscience or in any other way. One might be led to sup-
pose in the earlier part of the play, that even in their 
ingratitude and wickedness toward their father, that they 
had a fondness for each other; but it is not long before 
we discover that they hate each other as they do their 
father and their young sister. The crime of ingratitude 
brings with it its own punishment for the wicked daughters 
. of Lear. It is a crime against nature, which is never al-
lowed to go unpunished, in Shakespeare or in life. 
The other villain, Edmund, is one of these wicked men, 
who, like Richard III, choose to ally themselves with the 
powers of evil because they feel themselves outside the 
pale of normal nature. Edmund plans deliberately to bring 
about the ruin of his brother Edgar, and states as the mo-
tive for his crime that he must equal in some way his le-
gitimate brother, if not in birth. He reasons that, as 
long as he is not born under the pale of honor and custom, 
he will enjoy the pleasures that nature can give.him. This 
is the deliberate setting aside of moral judgment and the 
joining in a confederacy with sin. 
-Edm. Thou, nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound. 
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land; 
Well my legitimate, if this letter speed, 
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base 
Shall top the legitimate. I grow, I 
prosper: 
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! 132. 
Edmund ridicules the ~elief in planetary influence 
which was one of the most popular beliefs of the time. 
He states clearly that he is wicked, not because of this 
star or that, but because he chooses to be so. 
Edm. This is the excellent foppery of the 
world, that, when we are sick in fortune, 
--often the surfeit of our own behaviour, 
--we make guilty of our disasters the sun, 
the moon, and the stars: as if we were 
villains by necessity; fools by heavenly 
compulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers 
by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, 
and adulterers, by an enforced obedience of 
planetary influence; and all that we are 
evil in, by a divine thrusting on. 133. 
Edmund characterizes the goodness of Edgar, and the purity 
and peace of his conscience, when he says of him: 
A brother noble 
Whose nature is so far from doing harms 
That he suspects none: on whose foolish 
honesty 
My practises ride easy. 134. 
Edmund continues his villainous and treacherous practices 
until almost the end, when he fights with his own brother. 
132. Ibid: I, 2, 1-2, 16, 19-22. 
133. Ibid: I, 2, 128-138. 
134. Ibid: I, 2, 195-198. 
rr 
t It is at this time that he shows his conscience not to 
be entirely subuued to his evil passions. He is not such 
a villain as are Regan and Goneril. Before he dies he 
repents, and wishes to do an act of justice before it 
is too late. He is born outside the pale of the social 
order; he makes himself deliberately an enemy to gods and 
men, but at the end he proves that he has some humanity. 
Edm. I pant for life: some good I mean to do, 
Despite of my own nature. Q,uicldy send: 
Be brief in it, to the castle; for my 
writ 
Is on the life of Lear and Cordelia. 135. 
Of the conscience of Cordelia, one may say that it 
is one of those which is not swayed by passion. Her spirit 
is so gentle, and her nature so calm and even, that pas-
sion, even though it rises in her at her father's injus-
tice and her sisters' cruelty, is never allowed to gain 
the sovereignty over her judgment. She displays her 
love of virtue and modesty, and her admiration for truth, 
in the words: 
Cord. I yet beseech your majesty,--
If for I want that glib and oily art 
To speak and purpose not; since what 
I well intend, 
I'll do't before I speak,--that you 
make known 
It is no vicious blot, murder or foul-
ness, 
No unchaste action, or dishonor'd step 
That hath depriv'd me of your grace and 
favour; 
135. Ibid: V, 3, 243-246. 
r 
~---------------------------------------------------. 
But even for want of that for which I am richer, 
A still-soliciting eye, and such a tongue 
As I am glad I have not. 136. 
vVhen Goneril in her duplicity presumes to counsel 
Cordelia to be true to her husband as she has not been to 
her father, and tells her that she is suffering justly for 
her disobedience, Cordelia shows her confidence in her own 
innocence and her knowledge of her sister's crimes: 
Time shall unfold what plaited cunning 
hides: 
Who cover faults, at least shame them 
derides. 137. 
This is an expression of the doctrine that retribu-
tion will overtake the wicked. This brings up the ques-
tion that has been frequently discussed as to whether the 
theory of retribution which is so common in Elizabethan 
psychology, and also in the literature of the period, was 
not fulfilled in the case of Cordelia. Her fate was not 
dominated by Nemesis, but as Moulton says, 
by another dramatic motive,--that of pathos, 
--that unlocks the sympathy of the spectator, 
and sheds a beauty over suffering itself. Cordelia 
has devoted herself to her father; fate mysteri-
ously seconds her devotion, and leaves out nothing, 
not even her life, to make the sacrifice complete. 138. 
The tragedy of Macbeth presents a wonderful study of 
sin and its punishment. It is a tragedy of religion, state, 
royalty and patriotism, and above all, ambition. E. K. 
136. Ibid: I, 1, 227-234. 
137. Ibid: I~ 1, 283-284. 
138. Moulton, op.cit., p. 47. 
Chambers characterizes the playas a cosmic tragedy, and 
says that as such it is philosophical rather than psycho-
logical. 139. But the philosophical interest transcends 
rather than excludes the psychological, since after all 
it is through and not apart from human character that 
external forces are conceived as acting upon and disposing 
of human destinies. The psychological interest of the 
play lies in the study of the contrasted effects of sin, 
and the results of sin upon two characters of different 
mould and fibre, one that of a man--realizing itself in 
action, the other that of a woman, realizing itself in 
thought and will. The noblest side of Macbeth's nature 
is his bravery and devotion as a soldier,--away from the 
battle field he is like common men. Dowden expresses 
the same idea with regard to Macbeth's good qualities: 
The theme of the drama is the gradual 
ruin, through yielding to evil within and 
without, of a man, who though tainted from 
the first by base and ambitious thoughts, yet 
possesses elements in his nature of pO'ssible 
honor and loyalty. 140. 
That Macbeth was held in high esteem by his associ-
ates, and by the king himself, is shown in the very open-
ing of the play, when after the battle, Macbeth and Banquo 
are praised by the wounded sergeant for their bravery,' 
139. Chambers, E. K., Shakespeare: A Survey, Sedgwick 
& Jackson, London, 1925, p. 234. 
140. Dowden, Shakespeare, p. 138. 
and the king speaks highly of Macbeth in the words: 
Duncan 0 valiant cousinl worthy gentleman. 141. 
Craig says, 
The two great characters in Macbeth are 
both cast in noble mould, both consistently 
conceived and perfectly adjusted the one to 
the other. Macbeth is man yielding to tempta-
tion and plunging deeper and deeper into sin. 
Lady Macbeth is woman in the nature of her 
ambitions (as far as one can see, largely for 
her husband and for social position) in her 
sense of the importance of tangible things 
and of bearing and deportment, and in her 
methods with her husband. Perhaps Macbeth as 
conceived by Elizabethan audiences, would be 
more irrunediately condemned as a villain than 
he is by us. Ambition to them was fundamen-
tally a sin, and the idea of surrendering 
one's soul to the devil was more immediately 
horrible. Macbeth seems to place every hope 
upon the earthly life and to sacrifice every 
noble ideal and every manly virtue to a wicked 
ambition; but, in doing so, he does not rid 
himself of the fear of human justice. The 
element of earthly fear in his composition is 
large. He seems to be preyed upon throughout 
by dread of punishment, by horrible dreams, 
startings and agonies, than moved by any spir-
itualized remorse or repentance. 142. 
Stopford Brooke carrie~ out somewhat the same idea, 
when he says that killing in itself does not trouble 
Macbeth at all, because he is a rude soldier of a rude 
time, and killing is his trade. The thing that does 
trouble him is his violation of his code of honor. 143. 
141. Macbeth, I, 2, 24. 
142. Craig, Shakespeare, p. 723. 
143. Stopford Brooke, On Ten Plays of Shakespeare, 
p. 196. 
He says, arguing with Lady Macbeth and his own ambition, 
against the proposed crime: 
Macbeth He's here in double trust; 
First, as I am his kinsman and his 
subject, 
Strong both against the deed, then, 
as his host, 
\'Vb.o should against his murderer shut 
the door, 
Not bear the knife myself. 144. 
Macbeth understands clearly the enormity of his sin: 
Macbeth His virtues 
Will plead like angels! trumpet 
tongu'd, against 
The deep damnation of his taking-off; 
And pity, like a naked new born babe, 
Striding the blast; or heaven's cher-
ubim, hors' d 
Upon the sightless couriers of the air, 
Shall blow the horrid deed in every 
eye, 
That tears shall dro,vn the wind. I 
have no spur 
To prick the sides of my intent, but 
only 
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps 
itself 
And falls on the other. 145. 
Stopford Brooke says ~urther that this sense of honor, 
which is frequently man's only conscience, disappears 
entirely after Macbeth has begun his succession of terri-
ble crimes. He has no real remorse, but the wild in-
different recklessness which comes to one who knows that 
he has deliberately Shut himself off from his fellows by 
144. Macbeth, I, 6, 12-16. 
145. Ibid: I, 7, 18-27. 
-a fatal act of dishonor. 
Macbeth is under the control of a nameless fear. He 
really does not definitely will Duncan's murder. He says: 
-
Why do I yield to that suggestion 
\Vhose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my 
ribs, 
Against the use of nature? Present 
fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings: 
My thought, whose murder yet is but 
fantastical 
Shakes so my single state of man that 
function 
Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is 
But vlhat is not. 146. 
This horrible suggestion, or temptation, assails 
Macbeth through his imagination. Macbeth's will and 
reason are under the control of his imagination. In 
conjunction with the exterior diabolical agency of the 
wierd sisters, it keeps before him the crown which his 
ambition urges as the highest good. His imagination is 
at the root of his crime, but it also is the cause of 
his hesitations, his fears; and it is the cause of the 
terrible agony vmich he undergoes at the appearance of 
the ghost of Banquo. 
Lady M. 
Macbeth 
Are you a man? 
Aye, and a bold one, that dare look 
on that 
Which might appal the divine. 
146. Ibid: I, 134-141. 
Lady M. 0 proper stuff! 
~his is the very painting of your 
fear. 
This is the air-drawn dagger, which 
you said 
Led you to Duncan. 147. 
Macbeth has physical courage to a great degree, but 
no moral courage. It is this physical courage which is 
the cause of the high esteem in which he is held by his 
associates and. by the Icing :tn the early part of the play. 
The courage that he displays later on in the play is 
caused by his desperation. He has begun to be independ-
ent of Lady Macbeth, and is becoming accustomed to crime, 
and thus grows indifferent and bold. 
Macbeth I am in blood 
Steppld in so far that, should I 
wade no more, 
Returning were as tedious as go o'er: 
Strange things I have in head, that 
will to hand; 
\fuich must be acted ere they may be 
scann'd. 
Lady M. You lack the season of all natures, 
sleep. 
!',1ac beth Come, we III to sleep. My strange 
and self-abuse 
Is the initiate fear that wants hard 
use: 
We are yet but young in deed. 148. 
In the end, Macbeth's bold words when faced by 
Macduff display a courage which is caused by a new im-
pulse of passion. He will not live to be the "rabble's 
curse." 
147. Ibid: III, 4, 57-63. 
148. Ibid: III, 4, 136-143. 
Macbeth Before my body 
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, 
Macduff, 
And damn'd be he that first cries 
Hold, enough. 149. 
Mr. Albert B. Purdee has carefully worked out a study 
of the sin and punishment of Macbeth, and says that it 
parallels exactly the scholastic doctrine, as elucidated 
by St. Thomas. 
He says that as Shakespeare used Holinshed as his 
historical source, so he almost seems to have referred to 
St. Thomas Aquinas for his philosophy. St. Thomas and 
Shakespeare are statement and illustration of the same 
truths. Scholastic logical consistency is to be found in 
Macbeth--it is a complete study in sin, and it corresponds 
in a remarkable way to the treatment of the same subject 
by St. Thomas. 
Purdee divides the playas follows: He says that 
temptation to sin comprises the first act and the first 
,scene of the second act; that is, up to the commission of 
the crime. The sin itself is the subject of act two, and 
the consequences of the sin are brought out in the last 
two acts. 
According to Purdee, following St! Thomas, man reaches 
his supernatural end by the observance of acts, and into 
these acts enters the twofold element of reason and free 
will. The reason judges; the will determines upon 
149. Ibid: V, 8, 32-34. 
performance or omission. A will inclined to evil is the 
prime interior cause of sin; but there are two exterior 
causes that may enter in,man and demonic agencies. In 
the first scene of Macbeth the preternatural agency so-
liciting to sin is introduced. St. Thomas says that the 
devil tempts by exploring the inner condition of a man, 
that he may work on that vicious propensity to which a 
man is prone. (That is as much as to say tr~t a man's 
appetites and passions are likely to unite themselves to 
exterior causes of evil.) Then the devil forces a change 
in the appetites, and though he cannot actually force the 
will, he may incline it. This is just how the witches in 
Macbeth join their prophecies to the passion of ambition 
which is already rooted in his soul. 
The second exterior cause--man, is found in Lady 
Macbeth. Her wild and reckless determination carries her 
over all the dictates of reason and urges Macbeth away 
from cool judgment. Lady Macbeth stifles the cry of rea-
son, and makes outcast her very conscience, in which sure 
sentence is passed on the morality of acts. She unsexes 
and dehumanises herself. She is to precipitate the ruin 
of her husband. In Macbeth conscience makes one moral 
appeal, even if on ignoble scores. He saw the possibility 
of eternal punishment and, what grieved him still more 
deeply, the punishment that would dog him the rest of his 
life (poena concomitans). But he dismisses the warnings 
of his judgment, and his will is in accord with the urging 
to sin. 
In the second part of the drama the sin itself takes 
place, when Macbeth's will becomes insurgent against the 
law of God, and he carries out in act what he has been 
guilty of in desire. His imagination pictures to him the 
dagger that he is to use to kill his king and guest: this 
is the last protest against sin. He suffers in his con-
science but nevertheless carries out the deed. 
The consequences of sin are many. First, nature is 
corrupted. Man has three fold natural good: the intrinsic 
principles by which he is a rational being, the natural 
tendency to the perfonaance of virtuous acts, and the gra-
tuitous gift of original justice. Macbeth suffers corrup-
tion of his nature. He has habituated himself to evil, 
his reason is hesitant in action, his will is in arms 
against good;--his passion for evil grows. But beside 
this sapping of his moral forces, he is in a state of 
guilt. It is not merely the stain on his hands that he 
realizes, but that on his soul. 
Will all great Neptune1s ocean wash this 
blood 
Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will 
rather 
The multitudinous seas incarnadine, 
Making the green one red. 150. 
150. Macbeth, II, 2, 60-63. 
-An act of sin is rebellion against self, man, and 
God, and incurs a triple punishment. Macbeth's sin began 
internally with the wilful disregard of the dictates of 
right reason, and so his first punishment will come from 
his own soul--his mind will torture him with anxiety and 
uneaSiness, his conscience will be racked with remorse, 
and despair will freeze his heart. This is the concomi-
tant punishment spoken of by St. Thomas. The anxiety and 
insecurity caused by sin open the way to further sins. 
This is the cause in Macbeth of his murder of the grooms 
and of Banquo. St. Thomas places as one of the punish-
ments of sin the increased liability to temptation from 
the power of evil--it is not surprising that Macbeth 
should return to the weird sisters. Finally despair is 
the severest punishment of self on self. Macbeth is a 
rebel against God, against himself, and against human 
government. 
The last phase of Macbeth's earthly punishment is 
swift and terrible. He is oppressed by his sins, but he 
feels no contrition. He speaks of himself as much as of 
Lady Macbeth, when he asks the Doctor: 
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd; 
Pluck from the memory a root'd sorrow; 
Raze out the written troubles of the brain; 
And with some sweet oblivious antidote 
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous 
stuff 
Which weighs upon the heart? 151. 
For a man to repent, he who freely admitted the evil, 
must freely' turn to good. Macbeth does not turn to good, 
--he fights and dies. The eternal punishment alone re-
mains. 152. 
Macbeth's crime, as Wilson Knight says,is a blow 
against nature's unity and peace, a hideous desecration 
of all creative and family and social duties, all union 
and concord. He murders hospitality and sleep, therefore 
his punishment is a living death. 
that he hears the voice cry 
This is the reason 
Sleep no more, Macbeth does murder 
sleep. 153. 
This is the reason that he is not allowed his place at 
the banquet table. And finally it is this that makes him 
at the final catastrophe, cry to Macduff: 
Get thee back 1 my soul is too much 
charg'd 
With blood of thine already. 154. 
As to Lady Macbeth, she seems to have had mOl'e ori-
ginal goodness of character than Macbeth. Her crime was 
the direct result of a strong will influenced by fierce 
passion. 155. Miss Campbell says, that the principal 
151. Ibid: V, 3, 40-45. 
152. P'Urdee, Albert B. "Macbeth, A Study in Sin", 
Catholic World, Vol. ex, Nov. 1919, pp. 184-195. 
153. Macbeth, II, l~ 36. 
154. Ibid: V, 8, 6-7. 
155. Knight, Wilson, The Imperial Theme, pp. 134-5. 
cause of the dreadfulness of Lady Macbeth's despair lies 
in her having been false to herself as a woman. She is 
pictured as consciously unsexing herself, as converting 
all that is womanly into the courage and determination to 
be' cruel. Even more than Macbeth, she dyes her will in 
ambition; her punishment is more terrible than that of 
Macbeth, and brings her to the sin of self-destructi~n.156. 
Lady Macbeth was never really heartless, even in the 
midst of the overwhelming impulse which drove her to mur-
der; and after the natural good in her character had begun 
to emerge, she became the victim of an avenging conscience. 
Finally, in another rush of unregulated impulse, she laid 
violent hands on herself. As Brooke says: 
Lady Macbeth walks with her 
conscience at night, and dies before 
the dawn. 157. 
'Ene character of Banquo offers a striking contrast 
to that of Macbeth in the matter of conscience. Banquo 
hears the prophecies of the weird sisters, but because 
his conscience is sensitive, he dreads the appearance of 
evil, and does not allow himself to be unduly influenced 
by their promises. He is pleased with the idea of his 
descendants being kings, but he knows that from evil no 
good can arise. He warns Macbeth against the promises of 
156. Campbell, op.cit. p. 238. 
157. Stopford Brooke, Ten Plays £f Shakespeare, p. 204. 
the witches. 158 . 
Banquo knows the evil effect that imagination has 
upon the conscience, and even in sleep he guards against 
its taking too strong hold upon'him. He prays before he 
sleeps: 
Banquo Merciful powers 
Restrain in me the curs'd thoughts that 
nature 
Gives way to in repose. 159. 
Banquo with his keen, clear conscience, is set over against 
Macbeth, whose only conscience is his sense of honor. Ban-
quo also has a soldier's sense of honor, but it is strength-
ened by a good conscience, which distrusts even the sugges-
tion of evil. 
When Macbeth tempts him wi th promises of greatness 
in the words: 
If you shall cleave to my consent, 
when 'tis, 
It shall make honor for you, 160. 
He answers: 
So I 10 se none 
In seeking to augment it, but still 
keep . 
My bosom franchis'd and allegiance 
clear, 
I shall be counsell 'd. 161. 
BanquoTs clear-sighted conscientiousness is a menace to 
158. Campbell, op.cit., p. 193. 
159. Macbeth, II, 1, 8-10 .. 
160. Ibid: II, 1, 23-24. 
161. IbId: II, 1, 25-28. 
Macbeth, and it is because the tyrant fears Banquo's 
intelligence and his sensitive conscience, that Macbeth 
puts him to death. 
Macbeth Our fears in Banquo 
Stick deep; and in his royalty of 
nature 
Reigns that which would be feartd; 
'tis much he dares, 
And to that dauntless temper of his 
mind, 
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his 
valor 
To act in safety. 162. 
Beyond a doubt the character of Hamlet has been 
more discussed than any other in Shakespeare; and of all 
the problems that this very complex character presents, 
one that offers the most ground for discussion and disa-
greement is that of the extent of his moral responsi-
bility, and the reasons that lie at the bottom of his 
procrastination. 
That Hamlet before the appearance of the ghost was 
a man of pleasing appearance and address, admired by his 
associates and by the people in general, is vouched for 
by Ophelia in the speech beginning, 
0, what a noble mind is here o'er-
thrownl 
The courtier's, soldier's, scholer's, 
eye, tongue, sword. 163. 
Hamlet is as he is because the humor of melancholy pre-
dominates in him, not as a natural quality of his 
162. ~: III, 1, 49-54. 
163. Hamlet, III, 1, 149-150. 
disposition, but superinduced by his great grief for his 
father, and his sense of Shame and outrage at the manner 
of his father's death. Miss Crunpbell states this opinion, 
and remarks that naturally Hamlet was of sanguine disposi-
tion. We are sure that there must have been a great 
change in the disposition of Hamlet from the words, !tHe 
has forgone all mirth, failed to find delight in nature 
or in man." These changes are noteworthy because they 
~ changes, and indicate that the melancholy disposition 
is not natural to him. Miss Campbell continues: 
The grief that leads to the deadly sin of 
sloth was one of the regularly recognized types 
of that wicked grief which refuses to be con-
soled. ~~at such grief results in melancholy, 
a grief which so dries and cools the brain that 
the images of memory cannot be clearly retained, 
and a man's mind becomes dark and sluggish, is 
indicated in the writings of many authorities 
on the passions. To the philosopher of Hamlet's 
day, the picture, then, of one moved to revenge 
by heaven and hell and yet stayed by an excess 
of grief from action ••• would not have seemed to 
call for poetic exposition. Hamlet's type of 
grief was one generally accepted in his day. 164. 
Mr. Wilson Knight, on the same subject, remarks that 
when we first meet Hamlet the passion of melancholy has 
already started its disintegrating work, and that during 
-the rest of the play his outstanding peculiarities are 
his bitterness and his disillusionment. 165. 
164. Campbell, op.cit., p. 131. 
165. Knight, G. Wilson, \Vheel of Fire, p. 32. 
The melancholy which infects Hamlet's disposition, 
and which changes the entire course of his life, is the 
direct result of his father's death, and of the revela-
tion the ghost makes to him of the manner of that death. 
The duty of revenge Which the father lays upon his son 
is also one of the causes of Hamlet's melancholy. Looked 
at in that light, it is an evil, but it must be considered 
in the light of Renaissance thought, and not from a mod-
ern viewpoint. Revenge was a sacred duty, especially in 
the case of revenge for a death; and it was in the inter-
ests of carrying out this duty of revenge, that Hamlet 
"wipes from the table of his memory, all trivial fond 
records," 166. and declares that, "the commandment of 
the ghost shall live within the book and vol~ of his 
brain, unmix'd with baser matter," 167. until the behest 
of his father be fulfilled. 
There never enters Hamlet's mind a doubt as to the 
morality of revenge--a question that would certainly be 
foremost in a modern mind. The only difficulty that he 
has with regard to heeding the behest of the ghost, is 
the possibility that the apparition is not the spirit of 
his father. 
166. Hamlet, I, 5, 95. 
167. ~: I, 5, 98-99. 
Hamlet The spirit that I have seen 
May be the devil: and the devil 
hath power 
To assume a pleasing shape; yea, 
and perhaps 
Out of my weakness and my melancholy 
Abuses me to damn me. 168. 
The phase of the revenge that troubles Hamlet's 
conscience is not the morality of carrying it out, but 
the fact that he has not done his father's bidding im-
mediately; and this procrastination, according to modern 
critics, is due, not to weakness and vacillation of char-
acter, but to a sluggishness caused by the passion of grief. 
He is so overcome by the confirmation of his suspicions 
with regard to his uncle, and by a knowledge of his mother's 
perfidy, that he contemplates suicide. In the famous liTo 
be, or not to be," soliloquy it is not so much the fact 
that suicide is forbidden by God's law, that keeps him 
from it, but, the vivid imagination of the eternal punish-
ment that will fall upon suicides. 
Hamlet \Vho would fardels bear 
To grunt and sweat under a weary life, 
But that the dread of something after 
death, 
The undiscover'd country, from whose 
bourn 
No traveller returns, puzzles the will 
And makes us rather bear the ills we 
have 
Than fly to others that we know not of? 
Thus conscience does make cowards of us 
all. 169. 
168. Ibid: II, 2, 595-599. 
169. Ibid: III, 1, 74-81. 
In another place, however, suicide as a direct sin 
against God is more immediately pointed out. 
0, that this too, too solid flesh would 
melt, 
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew! 
Or that the Everlasting had not fix'd 
His canon 'gainst self-slaughter. 170. 
Hamlet's conscience then, is a deterrent in the task 
of fulfilling his father's commandment, but this was surely 
not intended by Shakespeare to be the motive of the delay. 
Stoll says that in revenge tragedies of Shakespeare's day, 
there was always a delay, as indeed there must have been 
to afford time for the working out of the plot. ~Vhat is 
necessary is to provide sufficient motive for the delay. 
In Hamlet a number of motives are at least suggested, 
though not all of them are presented with any fullness. 
Among these are the doubt about the ghost's identity (al-
ready discussed), the hero's aversion to the deed, 
The time is out of joint! 0 cursed spite 
That ever I was born to set it right, 171. 
and the desire to kill the king when he is engaged in some 
act of wickedness instead of in prayer. As to this final 
motive, it seems unnecessarily vindictive to us but it 
would not be so from the viewpoint of an Elizabethan audi-
ence. 
170. 
171. 
It was held that the future fate of an individual 
Ibid: I, 2, 129-132. 
Ibid: I, 5, 181-2. 
depended to a great extent upon his state or occupation 
immediately at the moment of his death. Therefore it 
would have been against the perfection of Hamlet's revenge 
and therefore in opposition to his conscience, to kill the 
king when his heart was "season'd for its passage." 
After Hamlet's mind is made up and he is thoroughly 
convinced that the king is guilty, he refrains from action 
only once: when he comes upon the king praying. Here, if 
we are to trust his own explanation, he refrains for a 
reason entirely consistent with his conscientious earlier 
behavior. Now, sure of his duty, he has determined to 
perform it with scrupulous thoroughness, and is dissatis-
fied with any mere approxLmation of accomplishment. After 
Hamlet has been convinced of his duty, and is determined 
to carry it out, the ghost of his father appears to him 
again, and here it is that the idea of conscience is most 
fully developed. His conscience tells him that he should 
not have spared the king, that he should not have so cruel-
ly wrung his mother's heart. This "conscience" of Hamlet 
comes in as his father's ghost, visible to him but invisible 
to his mother. The ghost of Hamlet's father urges him to 
revenge, not so much for himself as for Denmark; he makes 
no stipulations with regard to Claudius' damnation, and he 
expressly warns his son against cruelty to his mother. 
One deed of Hamlet's which is difficult of explanation 
because it seems so vindictive and so unnecessarily cruel, 
is the sending of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to their 
death. That he should kill Polonius is in the scope of 
his revenge,--he thought it was the king, and his apparent 
indifference when he discovers his error, is due to pre-
occupation with his plans for revenge; but these two young 
men, although they were tools of Claudius, showed no great 
enmity for Hamlet, and he was hardly justified in his 
treacherous act of cruelty toward them. This act of Hamlet's 
is inconsistent with his character, and calls forth a sort 
of concealed protest from Horatio, who usually agrees with 
all Hamlet's plans, and is willing to accompany him in 
everything. 
So Rosencrantz and Guildenstern go to't. 172. 
Hamlet answers his scruples with the decided answer: 
vVhy man, they did make love to their 
employment; 
They are not near my conscience. 173. 
One is inclined to believe that, if melancholy had 
not so strong a hold upon Hamlet, he would have found the 
murder of these two old school-companions very near his 
conscience, however influenced they were by the false rea-
soning of the king to aid him against Hamlet. 
After Hamlet's revenge has been partly carried out 
172. Ibid: V, 2, 55-56. 
173. Ibid: V, 2, 57-58. 
--after he has overcome the sluggishness which his melan-
choly has forced upon him--he goes straight on, without 
any hesitation from moral scruples; in fact his moral 
judgment commends him rather than otherwise. The passion 
of grief has been the cause of his long procrastination, 
and his conscience condemns him for it, but at the climax 
of his sacrifice his conscience is clear and his mind free 
from doubt. He proves himself in this to be a tragic hero, 
not a villain. Passion has led him to disregard for a 
time the warnings of his conscience, but he recovers, and 
dies at peace. 
Claudius is a character in Hamlet which also offers 
many interesting problems of conscience. A most remarkable 
discussion as to the guilt of Claudius, remarkable because 
it differs so radically from the generally accepted opinion, 
is that of Wilson Knight in the Wheel of Fire. 
It is a mistake to consider Claudius as 
a hardened criminal. vYhen Polonius remarks on 
the hypocrisy of mankind, the king murmurs to 
himself: 
0, 'tis too true 1 
How small a lash that speech doth give 
my conscience. 174. 
Again, Hamlet's play wrenches his soul with 
remorse--primarily not fear of Hamlet, as one 
might expect, but a genuine remorse. 
174. Ibid: III, 1, 47-48. 
\Vhat then? what rests? 
Try what repentance can. What can it 
not? 
Yet what can it, when one cannot 
o wretched state! 0 bosom black 
o limtd soul, that struggling to 
Art more engagtd! Help, angels! 
assay! 
repent? 
as death! 
be free, 
make 
Bow, stubborn knees, and, heart with 
strings of steel 
Be soft as sinews of the new born babe! 
All may be well. 175. 
Set against this lovely prayer--the full 
flower of a human soul in anguish--is the entrance 
of Hamlet, the late joy of torturing the King's 
conscience still written on his face, his eye 
a-glitter with the intoxication of conquest, ven-
geance in his mind, his purpose altered only by 
the devilish hope of finding a more damning moment 
in which to slaughter the King, next hastening to 
his mother to wring her soul, too. Which, then, 
at this moment in the play, is nearer the Kingdom 
of Heaven? The question of the relative ~orality 
of Hamlet and Claudius reflects the ultimate prob-
lem of the play. Claudius is very human, Hamlet 
is inhuman. Through no fault of his own Hamlet 
has been forced into a state of evil. Claudius, 
whose crime originally placed him in a state of 
evil, is now in a state of healthy and robust 
spiritual life. 176. 
This opinion is indeed hard on Hrunlet, and I fear, 
would not meet the approval of many present day critics; 
and I hardly think that it would be at all accepted by 
Elizabethan playgoers, who undoubtedly must have regarded 
Hamlet as a tragic hero, a victim of circumstances, chosen 
by fate to avenge a horrible crime, and Claudius as a 
175. Ibid: III, 3, 64-71. 
176. Knight, op.cit., 38-39. 
deep-dyed villain, whose moments of remorse were as truly 
caused by the reason influenced by passion, as were his 
very deeds of wickedness. 
Stopford Brooke expresses the generally accepted opin-
ion with regard to the guilt of the king: 
Fear is a common inhabitant in a treach-
erous soul. After the Mouse Trap, fear drinks 
up his (the king's) heart; and fear awakens his 
drugged conscience into idiotic speech. The 
King's conscience, for Shakespeare does not 
leave him without a semblance of it, totters 
about, uttering confused contradictions, and 
falls back again into its drugged slumbers. 
\~at sort of conscience it was, we hear in his 
soliloquy, when (after the terror of his dis-
covery) he tries to pray. Shakespeare opens 
the secret chrunbers of his soul. He confesses 
himself to himself-- his murder, his inability 
to pray. But there is forgiveness in heaven, 
he says, else what were the use of the existence 
of mercy; and to pray is to be pardoned. So 
will my fault be gone. But then, I keep all the 
pleasant results of my crime, and I doubt that 
one can be pardoned and retain the offence. That 
is often the way with earthly law, but not with 
heavenly. 
He prays; but his heart and its fear keep 
his thoughts to earth. He cannot get away from 
his dread of discovery. 
All the srune, it is a relief to have it out 
with his conscience, to have listened to its wail 
and bid it go to sleep; to have confessed in speech 
his crime; to have bluffed heaven with a desire 
for repentance. 177. 
This is surely the orthodox explanation of Claudius' 
conduct, and is more easily accepted than that of Knight, 
who would have us believe that the king is a beautiful 
177. Brooke, Ten ~ Plays of Shakespeare, p. 175. 
character, surprised by passion into a sin of which he 
heartily and sincerely repents. If passion is the cause 
of his sin, the same sudden change is the cause of his 
conversion. 'l'his sudden repentance, which according to 
Elizabethan psychology, ·was caused by the ready movement 
of spirits to the heart, serves to convince the audience 
all the more surely of his guilt. 
Another comment on the same subject, one which gives 
a clear picture of the effect of passion on the king, and 
characterizes him as a villain, is given by Miss Campbell: 
There is still to be reckoned the ·sin 
which is mortal, the sin which has come as 
the effect of passion which has perverted the 
will. The King as he tries to pray sees him-
self accur'sed like Cain and yet hopeful of 
mercy. But he cannot be forgiven while yet 
he holds the rewards of his deed. The three 
objects of his passion, in themselves sinful, 
are thus indicative of the mortally sinful 
nature of the King's passion. Ambition and 
lust have taken possession of him until they 
have turned his reason into an instrument for 
their own uses, and until they have indeed 
turned his soul away from God into mortal sin. 
And though God's vengeance is slow, there is 
no doubt in the mind of any reader of Hamlet, 
that the King has suffered punishment from the 
moment when he committed the crime, in the fear 
and suspicion and unrest of his days, in the 
increasing battalions of his troubles, and in 
the sick soul which could not rid itself of 
passion to find peace with God. Nor can any 
reader doubt that the eternal vengeance of God 
is to fall upon the King. 178. 
178. Campbell, op.cit., p. 145. 
There is still to be considered the problem of con-
science in some of the minor characters in the great play. 
The picture of the Queen's conscience is given in her 
own speeches and also in Hamlet's in the closet scene. 
There we see again the picture of sin as evil willed by 
reason perverted by passion. Hamlet says this plainly when 
he accuses his mother: 
You cannot call it love, for at your age 
The heyday in the blood is tame, it's 
humble, 
And waits upon the judgment; and what 
judgment 
Would step from this to this? 179. 
Hamlet speaks such truths to his mother, that she 
realizes that passion has overcome her judgment, and begs 
him to 
Spe ak no more, 
Thou turn'st my very eyes into my soul; 
And there I see such black and grain'd 
spots, 
As will not leave their tinct. 180. 
Hamlet sees that his motl~r realizes her guilt, and 
begs her to "confess herself to heaven, repent what was 
past, and avoic V'Jhat was to come. fI 181. 
Harnlet has "set up a glass, in which his mother can 
see the inmost part of hert! and he begs her to turn away 
from the evil into which passion has led her, and to 
179. 
180. 
181. 
Hamlet, III, 4, 67-70. 
Ibid: III, 4, 88-91. 
Ibid: III, 4, 147-149. 
conquer the devil by acts of virtue. She promises to keep 
Hamlet's secret, though she does not agree to keep the 
remainder of his behest. However her soul has been touched 
with remorse, and from this point she seems to defend Hamlet 
and to take sides with him at least covertly. Her con-
science reasserts its sway. She says: 
To my sick soul, as sins true nature is 
Each toy seems prologue to some great 
amiss, 
So full of artless jealousy is guilt 
It spills itself in fearing to be spilt. 182. 
The cry of a guilty conscience, remorseful and not 
knowing how to be rid of its burden, is evident in these 
lines. The queen's punishment goes on to the very catas-
trophe, as one woe follows upon another's heels, and her 
consciousness of her love for her son and the end of her 
wrongdoing come upon her. She is remorseful, and although 
Shakespeare does not say directly that she repents, we are 
certainly led to think that in the end her judgment again 
unites itself with her reason, and she is able to bring 
her passions under the control of her will. 
In the case of Polonius, he has no morality except the 
morality of worldly wisdom. According to his standards of 
morality, which are not more than surface-deep, his reason 
allows him to listen behind the arras, and to use his o~vn 
daughter as a tool for his spying. It is not passion that 
182. ~: IV, 5, 16-19. 
moves him, but perverted reason. 
As for Ophelia herself, she is too much under the 
control of her father to act freely, and in accord with 
her reason. Her conscience is free, but her will is not, 
and thus she has her share in bringing about the final 
catastrophe. 
Horatio is a man "vlho is not passion's slave", who 
acts exactly in accord with his conscience; he is one 
of those gentlemen of whom Castiglione speaks--tlan honest, 
a fair-conditioned man, and of an upright conscience." 
Finally, Laertes is moved by passion. His love for 
his father makes him speak and act against his conscience 
in that he dares the punishments of hell, in order to 
avenge himself upon his father's murderer: 
To hell, allegiance! vows, to the 
blackest devil! . 
Conscience and grace, to the profoundest 
pit! 
I dare damnation. To this point I stand, 
That both the worlds I give to negligence 
Let come what comes. 183. 
Laertes is Sincere, but because of his association 
with Claudius, his will becomes infected with evil and 
he descends to treachery. 
In this great pl~y, the poet has given us all vari-
eties of innocence and guilt, and from the study of this 
one play, we might arrive at Shakespeare's conception of 
conscience in all its phases. 
183. ~: IV, 5, 128-132. 
Chapter IV. A Summary of Shakespeare's Treatment of the 
Problem of Conscience. 
E. E. Stoll, in his study of Othello and Hamlet 
from a historical and comparative point of view, tells us 
that he would have us not try to find a definite psycho-
logical system in Shakespeare. He does not attempt to dis-
cover philosophical or ethical causes for variations in 
conduct, and sudden changes of moral standards. He says 
that Shakespeare was a playwright, not by any means a 
philosopher; that he was not interested in the moral devel-
opment or degeneration of a character, but in the general 
effect of the entire play •. The great conundrums in Shake-
speare, such as the reason for Iago's conduct and the ques-
tion of Hamlet's melancholy, do not trouble Mr. Stoll. He 
lays all that is inexplicable, or at least difficult of 
explanation, at the door of poetic and dramatic convention. 
Mr. Stoll himself is strictly consistent, but he differs 
radically from most Shakespearean critics, both of the 
present day and of earlier times. Most writers find in 
all the characters an essential psychological conformity. 
The difference between modern critics and those of an 
earlier date lies not in their agreement or disagreement 
as to the exixtence of a great psychological field of 
study in Shakespeare; the difference is in the viewpoint 
of that study. It was the practise of earlier students 
of Shakespeare to interpret charact~r problems, not from 
the viewpoint of Elizabethan psychology, but in the light 
of modern investigation in that line. Modern writers have 
been concerned not to discover what they might expect 
characters to do according to their own knowledge of psy-
chology, but they have made it their aim to interpret the 
characters from the viewpoint of Renaissance and Elizabethan 
psychology and moral philosophy. Surely, if we are to 
arrive at the truth with regard to Shakespeare's portrayal 
of his characters, we must view them in the light of his own 
knowledge. Shakespeare may not have been a philosopher or 
a psychologist, he probably was neither, consciously; but 
he was a profound student of human nature. He learned by 
first-hand observation the causes and effects of actions 
upon a man's character. But beside this "holding the mir-
ror up to nature II , which is the most far-reaching and com-
prehensive reason for his greatness, he must have had also 
a complete and detailed knowledge of the psychology of his 
times, even though that knowledge was practical and applied, 
rather than scholarly and scientific. We cannot consent 
that it was with no motive except dramatic stage effect 
that he portrays so vividly the result of the workings of 
passion upon Macbeth; or that he did not have a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the accepted psychology of the passions 
when he drew the great figures of Hamlet and the King. 
Mr. Craig, in his notes on ~~, says: 
Renaissance moral philosophy is a greater, 
worthier, and profounder thing than our current 
speculations on such subjects usually are. Shake-
speare said great and far reaching things about 
life, though not always the things his critics 
make him say, and has as his instrument a great 
ethical system of which we have grown unconscious. 184• 
In the study of the conscience in the plays of Shake-
speare, this fact of his consistent application of the 
accepted psychological principles of his day, becomes evi-
dent. The plays present examples, thoroughly consistent 
and intelligible, of problems of conscience in all its 
phases. After the Elizabethan understanding of this phase 
of moral philosophy has been discussed and its principles 
laid down, it is with a growing feeling of admiration for 
Shakespeare's profound insight into moral problems that 
one finds examples carefully drawn and psychologically 
consistent, of each phase of the conscience problem, most 
graphically and truthfully presented. And what strikes 
one as remarkable and worthy of all praise, is that from 
a study of the problems in Shakespeare, one comes to have 
a growing appreciation and respect for the psychology which 
was at the bottom of his characterizations. The moral 
philosophy of the Elizabethan as exemplified in Shakespeare, 
is, in spite of crudities, undoubtedly authentic. It is 
184. Craig, Hardin, "Ethics of King ~", in Philological 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, April 1925, pp. 97-109. 
not necessary nor apropos to attempt any deductions with 
regard to Shakespeare's religion. What is to the point 
is this,--that his doctrine of the conscience is thoroughly 
Christian and Catholic. Someone has said that St. Thomas 
gives the principle, and Shakespeare the illustration. 
The great dramatist's conformity to Catholic principles 
in this matter gives him an added claim to the respect 
.and admiration of all Who find in Shakespeare a perennial 
source of edification and delight. 
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